Paper long abstract:

How does do political dynamics in kleptocratic states play out transnationally (in an inside-out direction) and how do international anti-corruption initiatives play back in to the domestic space (in an outside-in direction)? To answer these complex questions, we trace the relationship between domestic political status and international anti-money laundering (AML) actions by focusing on four case studies of UK real estate purchases by elites from Central Asian kleptocratic states (Dariga Nazarbayeva, Temur Kulibayev, Gulnora Karimova and Maxim Bakiyev). We theorize that there is a stronger causal relationship in an inside-out direction than outside-in. Where AML investigations succeed they do so because the PEP has already lost office or good standing; where the PEP has retained their position they are able to defend the UWO. These cases fail where office is or has been retained. Moreover, we suggest that AML procedures may be used by kleptocratic regimes in order to fully expel an out-of-favor colleague. Via court documents and open source research, we mix qualitative comparative analysis with process tracing to test this theory. Our findings broadly affirm this theory but also point to the key variations in the casual process where professional enablers based in rule-of-law systems protect favored elites from rule-by-law settings. Not only are ‘enablers’ wittingly and unwittingly conspiring with national kleptocracies but regulators lack the resource to push back against the professional enablers.. The policy implications of the findings for the design of international AML instruments are evident and are expounded on in the conclusions.