Paper long abstract:

Islamic discourse in Azerbaijan—and broader discourse on national identity—has since the rise of nationalism around the second half of the nineteenth century in this part of the world been dominated and defined by the elite thinking and agency, with intra-societal dialogue on the matter, including in particular across the religious-secular divide, systematically muted and suppressed. This paper will offer an account of the dynamics behind the religious-secular divide in Azerbaijan over the past two decades of independence and the conditions underlying the ongoing process of normalization of Islamic discourse and the unfolding partnership across the country's religious-secular political landscape. The paper will begin by outlining the elite's attitudes to Islam, and the strategy of separating religion and politics in which those attitudes find expression. It will then proceed to show the complicity of civil society and the broader populace in the post-Soviet reproduction of the narrative of Islamic threat and the resultant religious-secular divide. The paper will follow up by discussing key factors contributing to the ongoing normalization of Islam across the public realm and the gradual bridging of the religious-secular divide amid ongoing state repression; among these factors being the primacy of the democratization agenda (for both religious and secular forces) over all other cleavages in the face of the lack of basic liberties. The paper will conclude by discussing the tactical nature of the religious-secular alliance and the incompatibility of the strategic narratives on democracy, secularism, and state-religion separation adhered to by the two camps.

Paper long abstract:

Urban spaces in the Caucasus provide a specific arena for religious pluralization and their own experiences of lived and regulated faith. Multi-ethnic and multi-religious port cities such as Baku and Batumi are defined by post-colonial city branding based on neo-liberal privatization processes and modernization projects with the goal of positioning themselves nationally and internationally.

Along with a strong presence of atheist concepts of development, cities create new 'iconic' places which turn urban spaces in attractive destination for canonical aspirations and less-canonical spiritualities. They are manifested in different ways, so that the religious landscapes may include formal and informal ways of faith expression. Based on a mix of methods, this paper discusses the values and pragmatics of informal worship sites and street corners in Baku and Batumi that may generate the contestation and sociability in urban spaces.

Paper long abstract:

My research is focusing on 'non-traditional' Christian sects in Azerbaijan, that mostly started to emerge within the last two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijani government replaced restrictive atheist ideology of the Soviet government with the more moderate local religious policies, that are welcoming the religious pluralism and 'multiculturality' in the country, but at the same time employ the instruments of control and regulations when it comes to the 'non-traditional' sects, or denominations that do not belong to the 'indigenous' religious communities, such as mainstream Islam, Orthodox Christianity or Judaism. Still the number of 'non-traditional' Christian Communities is growing along with their wider recognition and visibility. In my paper I would like to explore the emergence of these new religious groups, such as Protestants, Charismatics, Catholics, Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists and others, and address the following questions: How these communities are gaining their ground in urban city? How do they negotiate the places of worship and their 'non-traditional' religious identity with the 'host' or mainstream population? How do they define their boundaries and position themselves in relation to the 'traditional groups'? Who are the major followers of these communities and what specifically makes them attracted to these 'non-traditional' communities? How do local authorities regulate emerging religious diversity in Baku?

Paper long abstract:

As many researchers of the region note, the rapid religious revival (of Islam in particular) in post-Soviet societies has been met with resentment by certain parts of the population. Some of this has to do with the fact that both the society and the state were not prepared for the emergence of new non-Soviet secularism, mass circulation of new religious ideas and practices, and the spread of so-called "fundamentalist" Islam that doesn't conceptualize religion as a part of the "national tradition." Viewing religion in the framework of the secularization theory - as the "opium for people" and an archaism that is "out of place" in the modern world - is still common. Such views have also been strengthened by the rhetoric of the global war on terror and internal regional struggles against domestic terrorism, which have created a whole array of arbitrary and artificial distinctions/dichotomies between "good versus bad," "traditional versus non-traditional," and "moderate versus extreme" Islam(s). Caught in between these binaries, Muslims are facing the challenge of fitting themselves into the framework of "good, moderate, and traditional Islam" - trying to be religious while not being accused of "excessive" religiosity. However, oftentimes in order to "fit" and function in such an environment proponents of Islam are obliged to present themselves as "super-modern" and "successful" while distancing their religious practice as far as possible from any vestige of "blind faith." There is also a growing audience for messages of "rationalized" and "individualized" Islam that helps people to become "successful" in this world while remaining religious and ethical. This paper is going to focus on the two cases of "coaching for success" by Shamil Alyautdinov, a mufti-turned-trainer from Moscow, and by Kuanysh Shonbay, a former managing partner of the Kazakhstani halal restaurant chain Rumi.