Click the star to add/remove an item to/from your individual schedule.
You need to be logged in to avail of this functionality.
Log in
- Convenors:
-
James Millward
(Georgetown University)
Kelly Hammond (University of Arkansas)
Send message to Convenors
- Theme:
- REG
- Location:
- Posvar 5702
- Start time:
- 26 October, 2018 at
Time zone: America/New_York
- Session slots:
- 1
Long Abstract:
Whether one subscribes to the official Chinese explanation that it arises from virulent, imported ideology, or accepts the critics' view that the Chinese state itself has created or exacerbated it—Xinjiang and the Uyghurs clearly are clearly in a state of on-going, acute crisis. One prominent aspect of long-term crisis are the many displacements, demographic, political and cultural, that it entails. The crisis is, moreover, reflected in intensifying difficulties in researching the situation, challenges that go beyond methodological to become political and ethical.
The four papers in this panel explore four different dimensions of displacement, mobility, and conflict. Mukeddes Omer asks whether and what kinds of Han migration to Xinjiang, to the bingtuan and elsewhere, are linked to inter-ethnic strife with the regions' Uyghurs. Is Han settlement among¸ or apart from, Uyghurs more likely to engender conflict? To do this she must work creatively with the superficially ample but awkwardly aggregated state statistics on Han migration and settlement in segregated or integrated Xinjiang communities. Sean Roberts fights upstream against torrents of Chinese propaganda, media framings and Islamophobia to argue that recent involvement of Uyghur militants with Al Qaeda in Syria resulted not from supposed attractiveness of jihadist messaging, but rather from push factors driving Uyghurs out from China by the thousands, thus planting seeds of the very problem PRC authorities claim to want to avoid. Elise Anderson alerts us to the recent displacement of Uyghur soundscapes—music and other audio culture—from metropolitan Urumchi, which has left behind bland political paeans and the shrill susurrus of securitization. State policies are thus reshaping the acoustic along with the physical environment of Xinjiang. Anderson's work reminds us of the challenges of fieldwork in Xinjiang under ever-tightening controls: where free expression is impossible, without access to interviewees or out of fear for their safety, she listens to sounds rather than words. Chiara Olivieri brings these concerns to the study of Uyghur diaspora narratives, not only telling us their stories, but self-reflexively questioning the social scientist's role in recording and relating them. The effort reveals the global ubiquity of colonizing discourse, but points to some suggestions towards epistemological escape from the dilemma.
Accepted papers:
Session 1Paper long abstract:
I seek to explore the following questions in this paper. Does the settlement of the dominant ethnic group members to a minority group populated contested territory result in ethnic conflict? Do different types of settlement patterns lead to different results in settler-local ethnic conflict? How does elements of economic development, state education, and affirmative action matter in this process? In order to answer these question, I propose a new typology of settlement that differentiates situations of settlers being predominantly segregated from the local community and situations of settlers being predominantly integrated into the local community. I term the former situation as segregated settlement and the later as integrated settlement. Furthermore, I argue that segregated settlement would primarily lead to sons of the soil conflict while integrated settlement would lead to primarily resource based ethnic conflict. I choose Xinjiang as my main case study to test the validity of the model proposed. I work with the county level data from 1990 to 2005 as my unit of analysis. Out of 101 counties that I have data of ethnic conflict, economic development, education and ethnic composition on, 66 of them have at least one Bingtuan division established before 1990. I argue that the existence of primarily Han occupied Bingtuan in those countries formed a pattern of segregated settlement. In counties where there is no Bingtuan division established before 1990 but still possess a significant number of Han settlers (merchants, government officials public service workers etc.), I argue those to be integrated settlement. According to Chinese census data, in 1990, 38% of the total Xinjiang population is already Han (which was 7% in 1953), where Uyghurs accounts for 48% of the total population. The same year, 89% of the Bingtuan population was Han, and those Bingtuan Han accounts for 34% of the total Han settlers in Xinjiang. I use both qualitative and quantitative research methods to explore these data. I aim to understand the link between different patterns of settlement and different types of ethnic conflict in counties of Xinjiang and what role did the state policy play in these cases.
Paper long abstract:
Over the course of 2014, as the People's War on Terror ramped up in Xinjiang, the number of live concerts, plays, and variety shows performed by Uyghur arts ensembles in Ürümchi dropped dramatically lower than it had been in 2013. Ürümchi-based ensembles were sent down on months-long excursions to the counties, townships, and villages of Southern Xinjiang to perform variety shows with explicitly propagandistic, anti-terrorism themes. By 2015, concerts in Ürümchi were nearly non-existent, signaling a dramatic shift in the soundscape that was once an intimate part of Uyghur life there. Reports coming out of post-2016 Xinjiang reveal that the soundscape has continued to change in even more dramatic ways: five-a-day calls to prayer have been replaced with the frequent screams of police sirens; television and stage programming, long a "final frontier" for the Uyghur language, are in serious decline; and performing artists find themselves under increasing scrutiny, sometimes subject to charges of terrorism and long-term imprisonment. In this context, some artists have begun penning essays and songs in praise of the Party, harkening back to Cultural Revolution-era practices. In this paper, I draw from the nearly four years I have spent conducting ethnographic and archival research in Xinjiang, as well as from a series of interviews with Uyghurs in the diaspora, to explore the drastic changes that are being made to Uyghur soundscapes in contemporary Xinjiang. In particular, I focus on one song, Shir'eli El'tékin's 2017 "Re'is Shi Jinping'gha Béghishlanghan Küy" (A song for leader Xi Jinping), analyzing both the lyrics and the relatively "flavorless" melodic structure of the song. By comparing the lyrics and melody to the larger body of Shir'eli's repertoire as a professional muqam performer and beloved pop singer, my analysis shows that "Re'is Shi Jinping'gha…" marks a significant stylistic departure not only from Shir'eli's performance style but also from the aesthetic sensibilities most central to Uyghur music. The current political climate in Xinjiang means that I will be unable to interview Shir'eli for the foreseeable future; thus, I check my own analysis against opinions garnered from interviews with diaspora Uyghurs in Summer 2018, positing several speculative, provisional arguments about how songs such as "Re'is Shi Jinping'gha..." can help us to better understand the ways in which the surveillance state is violently and invasively reshaping the very sound of Uyghur life.
Paper long abstract:
In recent years, there have been numerous reports about the presence of Uyghurs from China in Syria, mostly fighting for a group called the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) , which is reported to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Al-Nursra Front. Allegedly, the Uyghurs in Syria number in the low thousands and include not only fighters, but their wives and children. While there is a long history of Uyghur dissatisfaction and dissent within China, this fighting force in Syria represents the first viable Uyghur militant group inside or outside China since the 1940s. This paper examines the question of how this group came into being, arguing that it is a direct outcome of the Chinese government's framing of Uyghur dissent as terrorism since 2001 and, in particular, of the state's security policies in the wake of the July 2009 ethnic riots in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. In the aftermath of these riots, the Chinese government's already draconian counter-terrorism policies targeting Uyghurs expanded, particularly with regards to more pious Uyghurs and especially in rural regions. As a result, tens of thousands of pious Uyghurs reportedly utilized human trafficking networks to flee China via southeast Asia. It was this migration of already alienated and pious Uyghurs that served as a recruiting ground for TIP, which had previously been a shell organization within Al-Qaeda with no viable fighting force. In this sense, TIP in Syria is a self-fulfilling prophecy of China's counter-terrorism policies, representing the religiously inspired militant movement the Chinese government had long claimed as a security threat, but that had previously not existed.