Paper short abstract:

The experience of modelling clay raises questions about the validity of Cartesian and Aristotelian divisions of mind from body, matter from form. Clay's plasticity facilitates the emergence of an alternative ontological position in which thinghood and personhood are mutable and interrelated.

Paper long abstract:

Aristotle divided things into the matter of which they are made and the form that matter takes. Decartes separated the mind from the body. From art, architecture and design to psychology and cognitive science, these schisms have had an enormous influence on Western culture. I want to show that playing in a serious manner with clay can not only challenge Aristotelian and Cartesian divisiveness but can also bring forth a more dynamic description of the world in which minds, people and things are in a state of perpetual reconfiguration.  

I will present a series of examples from my own experiences of modelling clay to show how, by paying close attention to the process of sculpting from the perspective of Material Engagement Theory (Malafouris 2013), I can create a detailed description of a mutable sense of agency and of self in which intention is experienced as a systemic phenomenon rather than as a property of the person. I will show how this radical ontological re-positioning has important implications for understanding how meaning emerges from artistic engagement. In so doing, I wish also to demonstrate that playing with clay can be used in an investigative manner - as a way of thinking about thinking and as a tool for material conceptualisation.

Malafouris, L. How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2013.