Short Abstract:

Is it possible to use the capability approach to critique structures of injustice? In this paper, I sketch a capabilitarian critique of structural injustice based on agency freedom, drawing from the conception of agency in the capability approach literature on the one hand, and the literature on structural injustice from feminist critical social theory on the other.

Long Abstract:

Drawing from the conception of agency in the capability approach literature on the one hand (particularly in the work of Amartya Sen, Sabina Alkire, and Jay Drydyk), and the literature on structural injustice from feminist critical social theory (particularly from Iris Marion Young and Sally Haslanger) on the other, I argue that a capabilitarian critique of structural injustice, based on agency (analogous to an analysis of capabilities in order to assess wellbeing), enables the capability approach to contribute to deeper ‘synchronic and diachronic explanations’ of what Drydyk has called the ‘background conditions’ of injustice, an area of research that has been often overlooked within the capability approach and its applications, which has mostly focused on the foreground (i.e. capability measurement) or the mid-ground (i.e. expanding capability) of injustice.

I claim that a more thorough account of structural injustice for the capability approach will help us get closer to actualizing and applying the “comparative, non-ideal approach to justice” that Sen proposed in The Idea of Justice, which I illustrate through an application in a development research project conducted in the Southern Philippines. The Land Use Change in the Uplands: Impacts and Drivers (LUCID) Project was a multidisciplinary research project that investigated the social and economic impact of the widespread adoption of genetically-modified (GM), high-yield variety corn among small farmers of the Upper Pulangi Watershed, in the province of Bukidnon. One aspect of the research sought to understand the social practices and structures that led the small farmers to articulate a "loss of freedom," or feelings of being constrained to continue farming GM corn despite the financial risks they themselves identified.

Finally, I also assert that such a capabilitarian critique of structural injustice allows the articulation and identification of factors that typically aren’t accounted for in policy-making analyses, describing the background conditions of injustice--particularly, social relations and practices--moving beyond just individuals and the state.