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- Convenors:
-
Jay Drydyk
(Carleton University)
Lori Keleher (New Mexico State University)
Asha Mukherjee (Visva-Bharati)
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- Format:
- Thematic Panel
- Theme:
- Philosophical and ethical foundations and implications of the capability approach
Short Abstract:
How are human beings capable of recognizing injustice and seeking justice? And how are they capable of moral progress in doing so? Contributors to this panel offer philosophical analysis of progressive moral knowledge of justice and injustice. They draw upon evolutionary moral psychology, conceptual analysis of dignity, Nussbaum’s capability approach, and the thinking of Rabindranath Tagore.
Long Abstract:
One reason why the capability approach has such wide appeal is its relevance to social and global justice. Perhaps its most prominent tenet is that capability shortfalls – unequal freedoms to live well – are among the most salient inequalities that are unjust, and removing them clearly advances the cause of social and global justice.
Yet one capability that has not been explored extensively by the capability approach is the capability for justice. The question here is: How are human beings capable (individually and collectively) of recognizing injustice and seeking justice?
This important foundational question relates to several themes of the 2024 HDCA conference. Measuring progress in human development (Theme 1) presupposes that we know that what we are measuring is genuine progress that advances the cause of social and global justice, objectively recognizable as improving genuine well-being (Theme 3) in ways that are genuinely equitable (Theme 4).
Valuable contributions have been made by Nussbaum’s work on moral and political emotions, and on education, and by Sen’s work on public reasoning. Nevertheless, much research remains to be done before this question will be answered adequately.
This panel contributes to understanding the capability for justice in three different ways.
Jay Drydyk cites research in evolutionary moral psychology to identify basic, internal, and combined capabilities involved in recognizing injustice. (a) In Nussbaum’s category of ‘basic capabilities’, we can place innate capacities for sympathy, loyalty, trust, respect for autonomy, and fairness; these innate capacities are elicited and shaped by early childhood upbringing and education. (b) Norm psychology – recognition, conformity, and emotional responses to social norms – adds a further set of combined capabilities. (c) Finally, hierarchies introduce moral distortions, which are overcome in processes of moral progress. Hence we can also speak of individual and collective capabilities for moral progress. Drydyk shows how capability concepts can aid the achievement of functionings in the first domain by triggering the senses of sympathy, respect for autonomy, and fairness at once. In the third domain, sensitivity to unequal capabilities aids the achievement of moral progress by generating negative judgments about neglect and subordination.
Lori Keleher’s presentation shows how the mandate for moral progress is embedded in the very concept of human development, in the particular way it embraces the idea of equal human dignity. She begins by observing that the term “dignity” can be used to convey two radically different meanings. It can refer to a value or worth that is contingent upon some status, performance, attitude, or moral state; in that sense, dignity is not inherent in everyone; some people have it, while others do not. This usage is antithetical to moral progress, because it can be used to condone exclusion and subordination. The alternative concept of dignity is that it is inherent in all human beings, and this conception is more conducive to moral progress because it calls upon us to ensure the recognition of human dignity. When people are marginalized in society, the equal dignity that they inherently possess is not recognized in the ways they are treated (or neglected) in social relations and by social institutions.
To complete this panel, Asha Mukherjee begins by addressing the ends and means of moral progress. Drawing on recent moral progress literature, she clarifies the nature of moral progress: it is not only living better, with greater adherence to the demands of morality; it also involves improvement in moral thinking. This can involve giving consideration to those who were excluded from consideration, and it can also involve ceasing to treat some people as second-class subordinates to others, and instead treating them as equals in dignity. Then she proceeds to apply these questions to the Indian context. Following leads by Martha Nussbaum and Rabindranath Tagore, she examines challenges of moral progress overcoming exclusion and subordination. Combining consideration of tradition with the everyday pro-social behaviour of Hindu-Muslim community, along with basic moral capacities for love, sympathy, trust, loyalty and respect, Mukherjee casts new light on capability shortfalls in Indian society.
Accepted papers:
Paper short abstract:
How are human beings capable of recognizing injustice, of knowing which differences and inequalities among us are unjust? This presentation identifies factors in our moral psychology that support awareness of injustice and shows how capability concepts mobilize and facilitate that support.
Paper long abstract:
Context
In The Idea of Justice Amartya Sen rejected ‘transcendental’ conceptions of justice that set out necessary and sufficient conditions for a perfectly just society. Ingrid Robeyns responded by asking how, without referring to an ideal of justice, one can reply to people claiming that justice has been achieved, when it has not.
In other words, how are we capable of recognizing injustice, if not by comparing the actual world to an ideal world that satisfies principles of justice?
Methodology
I begin with conceptual analysis of valuable capabilities as freedoms to live well. I extend this analysis by asking: when we recognize that people are unequally free to live well, how does this activate the basic ‘working parts’ of our moral psychology?
Findings from moral psychology
Drawing upon the recent high-level synthesis by Victor Kumar and Richmond Campbell A Better Ape: The Evolution of the Moral Mind and How It Made Us Human (Oxford 2022), I locate the basic ‘working parts’ of our moral psychology at three levels.
I. A few basic moral sensitivities were the first to evolve: sympathy, loyalty, respect for autonomy, trust, and fairness.
II. Later to evolve was norm psychology. Here we identify particular behaviours that offend against our basic moral sensitivities.
III. With the advent of agriculture, surplus wealth, and social hierarchies, moral distortion was incentivized to favour people higher and disadvantage people lower in the hierarchies. Moral progress since then has involved detecting and removing these distortions.
Analysis & Conclusion
In this context, I make two observations about capabilities.
(1) The valuable capabilities are freedoms to live well. Therefore, when we witness unequal capabilities, three of these basic moral sensitivities are triggered at once: sympathy, respect for autonomy, and sensitivity to unfairness.
(2) Capability thinking is concerned not merely with expanding capabilities; it is equally concerned with unequal capabilities. This concern also leads the moral mind to object when some people’s restricted capabilities are ignored, or regarded as less important. In this way, capability concepts are supportive of moral progress.
I conclude: these are two ways in which capability concepts can contribute powerfully to the human capability for recognizing and knowing injustice. To answer Robeyns’s challenge: this explains how, simply by recognizing unequal capability (unequal freedom to live well), justice-seeking people can be aware that their work is not done.
Paper short abstract:
Conceptual analysis reveals both that certain concepts of human dignity at work in development entail false and dangerous notions, and that human development is fundamentally the recognition of human dignity properly understood as the inalienable, equal, and inherent value of all human beings.
Paper long abstract:
I argue that authentic human development is fundamentally a recognition of our universal human dignity. I offer a conceptual analysis of some of the significantly different ways “human dignity” is commonly used. Many uses entail a value that is contingent upon some status, performance, attitude, or moral state. I argue that such concepts and their corollaries within development work, i.e., that development efforts can bring, enhance, restore, or provide dignity are dangerous for human development.
We must reject the idea that human dignity emerges as a consequence of development efforts. This idea is not simply false, it is dangerous. It opens the door to perilous ideas. For example, the idea that those who are suffering various forms of capability deprivation due to oppression, structural injustice, war, displacement, or other tragedy, are also suffering a loss of dignity, that is that they are no longer inherently valuable. Or the idea that some people are more valuable than others. Or, perhaps even worse, the idea that some human beings have value and others have none.
Human dignity must be understood as the inherent, inalienable, and equal human dignity of all human beings. It follows from this understanding that dignity is not something we earn or facilitate for ourselves or others, as many use the phrase human dignity suggest. Instead, dignity is an inherent value that all human beings already have and have equally. The work we do in international development is not providing, granting, or enhancing human dignity. We do not have this power. We cannot provide what is already there.
Yet, development work is critically important to human dignity. We must work to ensure the recognition of human dignity. Too often individuals as well as our formal and informal institutions fall short of recognizing human dignity. When people are not allowed access to nutrition, education, medical attention, housing, security, employment, political participation, or other valuable institutions, because of their sex, gender, race, caste, age, or faith, they still have inherent value, but that value is going unrecognized. Thus, human development can be appropriately understood as recognizing, and facilitating the recognition of, human dignity.
The presentation concludes with suggestions of how we might identify and enact more and less robust recognitions of human dignity and what follows from doing so. I suggest Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities offers one way to institutionalize the recognition of human dignity.
Paper short abstract:
Conceptual analysis reveals both that certain concepts of human dignity at work in development entail false and dangerous notions, and that human development is fundamentally the recognition of human dignity properly understood as the inalienable, equal, and inherent value of all human beings.
Paper long abstract:
I argue that authentic human development is fundamentally a recognition of our universal human dignity. I offer a conceptual analysis of some of the significantly different ways “human dignity” is commonly used. Many uses entail a value that is contingent upon some status, performance, attitude, or moral state. I argue that such concepts and their corollaries within development work, i.e., that development efforts can bring, enhance, restore, or provide dignity are dangerous for human development.
We must reject the idea that human dignity emerges as a consequence of development efforts. This idea is not simply false, it is dangerous. It opens the door to perilous ideas. For example, the idea that those who are suffering various forms of capability deprivation due to oppression, structural injustice, war, displacement, or other tragedy, are also suffering a loss of dignity, that is that they are no longer inherently valuable. Or the idea that some people are more valuable than others. Or, perhaps even worse, the idea that some human beings have value and others have none.
Human dignity must be understood as the inherent, inalienable, and equal human dignity of all human beings. It follows from this understanding that dignity is not something we earn or facilitate for ourselves or others, as many use the phrase human dignity suggest. Instead, dignity is an inherent value that all human beings already have and have equally. The work we do in international development is not providing, granting, or enhancing human dignity. We do not have this power. We cannot provide what is already there.
Yet, development work is critically important to human dignity. We must work to ensure the recognition of human dignity. Too often individuals as well as our formal and informal institutions fall short of recognizing human dignity. When people are not allowed access to nutrition, education, medical attention, housing, security, employment, political participation, or other valuable institutions, because of their sex, gender, race, caste, age, or faith, they still have inherent value, but that value is going unrecognized. Thus, human development can be appropriately understood as recognizing, and facilitating the recognition of, human dignity.
The presentation concludes with suggestions of how we might identify and enact more and less robust recognitions of human dignity and what follows from doing so. I suggest Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities offers one way to institutionalize the recognition of human dignity.
Paper short abstract:
I begin by addressing the ends and means of moral progress. Drawing on recent moral progress literature, I clarify the nature of moral progress: it is not only living better, with greater adherence to the demands of morality; it also involves improvement in moral thinking.
Paper long abstract:
The term “Human dignity” has evolved over the years recognizing dignity as something inherent to everyone. How do we understand the ‘principle of equal dignity’ in pluralist society in India? How to determine moral exclusivity and inclusivity in the context of capabilities commitment and moral progress? Victor Kumar, in his recent book develops Moral progress theory that is designed to guide ethical thought when conditions are less than ideal. More specifically, moral progress theory seeks to identify the cultural evolutionary mechanisms that have driven reliable and durable moral progress in the recent past and, therefore, are likely to do so in the near future as well. The Progress in wellbeing is not moral progress. Moral progress must be rational and not irrational so that it has a potential to become moral theory.
Following Martha Nussbaum work on Capability Approach and her book on education, the paper tries to answer the above questions investigating the recent Indian politico- economic and cultural developments related to moral progress and improvement in general well-being and quality of life. The concept of human being is not just limited to animality, biological and rational aspect but also includes normative, evaluative, social and spiritual. Granting that the notion of good life is quite complex and fluid, the search for good life is the most important aspect to be looked into for human development.