Short Abstract:

This paper proposes a revision of the concept of capability within Sen’s capability approach. Employing a methodical approach in Philosophy, known as Conceptual (Re-)Engineering, the semantic definition is improved to fulfil the practical functions of capability that Sen intended. Through the re-engineering, this paper aims to enhance the functionality of capability within the capability approach.

Long Abstract:

This paper proposes a revision of the concept of capability within Sen’s capability approach. While the concepts of functioning and capability are devised to serve as informational bases surpassing limitations of traditional evaluation frameworks in assessing quality of life, the capability concept is often criticised as a pitfall of the capability approach. However, such criticism is primarily related to the semantic definition and its implications, rather than Sen’s original purposes, rationales, and practical functions of capability. Thus, this paper argues that, instead of abolishing the concept, it should be ameliorated within the capability approach to better fulfil its intended roles in evaluating quality of life. The argument posits that Sen’s definition fails to adequately capture the practical functions of capability. Therefore, this paper targets to improve Sen’s semantic definition of capability within the approach.

To enhance the concept of capability, this paper employs a methodical approach in philosophy, known as conceptual (re-)engineering. This methodology seeks to improve, revise, or create semantic definitions and logical references for concepts to achieve practical impacts. Conceptual (re-)engineering is motivated by the recognition that certain concepts are defective and in need of amelioration to implement their practical functions for beneficial consequences. This suggests that conceptual engineering focuses on clarifying practical functions of targeted concepts, including their purposes, essential features, and beneficial usages. Once relevant conceptual functions are identified, the semantic definitions are expected to be critically assessed to determine their effectiveness. In case of deficiencies, the conceptual (re-)engineering process is followed by enhancing or changing the semantic definitions by addressing them to achieve the conceptual functions. Based on this methodical approach, this paper examines how Sen initially develops the semantic definition of capability into which the conceptual functions are transformed in arguably inappropriate ways. Subsequently, it highlights defects in Sen’s definition of capability and its implications. Lastly, the semantic definition of capability is re-engineered to overcome the deficiencies in fulfilling its intended roles within the capability approach.

An analysis of Sen’s capability approach reveals the practical functions of functioning and capability in assessing a person’s actual achievement concerned with the ends of life and an agent’s substantial opportunity towards the quality of life, respectively. These conceptual functions are transformed into semantic definitions to which Sen attaches normative priorities. In the case of functioning, it is defined as a person’s achieved being and doing that she may value or have reason to value. The practical function of assessing ‘actual achievement’ is specified to measure someone’s actual ‘being’ and ‘doing’ with evaluative priorities placed on these objective aspects over subjective or indirect contents in the quality of life. The feature related to ‘the ends of life’ is crystalised into having ‘value’ or ‘reason to value’. In the case of capability, the concept is semantically defined as alternative functioning that a person can choose. The objectives to assess someone’s ‘substantial opportunity’ are projected to ‘alternative functioning’ with normative priorities given to possibilities that the person can do and be. More importantly, the emphasis on the agency aspect is translated into someone’s ‘choice’ as Sen attaches particularly significant values to the freedom of choice. These demonstrates that Sen’s evaluative priorities are reflected in the semantic definitions of functioning and capability in line with the conceptual functions.

Although the capability approach is widely praised with its practical functions, capability is often left behind functioning in terms of normative priority and applicability. This discrepancy arises due to the semantic definition and the logical reference of capability. Defined as a substantial opportunity that an agent ‘can choose’, the capability approach considers ‘choosable’ substantial opportunities as relevant and significant informational bases, excluding non-choosable ones. However, this concept may not be relevant in evaluating individuals who face difficulties in making normative or reasonable choices. Even when capability is deemed relevant, actual achievements (functionings) are considered more important than alternative states (capabilities). This is because the achievement of relevant functioning is clearly intended within capability. In other words, the semantic meaning of capability, defined as ‘alternative functioning’, is dependent on that of functioning. Furthermore, capability is argued to be conceptually derivative of functioning because someone’s alternative states can be understood as parts of their achievements. Indeed, there is no restriction in the definition of functioning to include ‘being able to choose’ or ‘choosing’. This implies that the logical reference of functioning includes that of capability. If so, the capability information may not be necessary in evaluation. Therefore, Sen’s capability concept is argued as dysfunctional within the capability approach as long as the semantic definition remains unchanged.

Despite the challenges in Sen’s definition of capability, it is important to recognise that the conceptual functions remain valid in evaluation. If agents’ substantial opportunities toward the quality of life are regarded as essential information in evaluation, the concept of capability should not be overlooked. Instead, it should be semantically improved because Sen’s original definition deviates from the conceptual functions. Thus, this paper proposes a re-engineered semantic definition of capability with the following arguments. Firstly, the choice condition should be eliminated from the definition because ‘choosing’ is not always relevant or significant in assessment. Even if the freedom of choice is not explicitly expressed in the formal definition, the logical reference can imply the exercise of freedom as possible contents in capability when it is considered as significant in some contexts. Secondly, the ‘achievability’ of substantial opportunity should be emphasised in the definition because the value of capability depends on its achievability rather than its ‘alternatively choosability’. Thirdly, the definition of capability should be semantically independent from that of functioning. Although capability is considered to have its independent values in the capability approach, Sen’s original definition of capability, which is alternative ‘functioning’, assumes its values to depend on actual achievement of relevant functioning. Consequently, the semantic definition of capability is re-engineered in this paper as a person’s achievable being and doing that the person may value or have reason to value. With the conceptual re-engineering, this paper encourages the capability approach to go beyond functioning to the post-engineered capability.