Short Abstract:

Neglecting vulnerable individuals in research can lead to unethical practices that undermine their humanity. Using an auto-ethnographic method, from a moral philosophical perspective (Kant's categorical imperative and the capability approach, and Honneth’s theory of recognition), I reflect on the ethics entailed in conducting research with vulnerable groups, in this case, undocumented migrants.

Long Abstract:

Neglecting vulnerable individuals in research can lead to unethical practices that undermine their humanity. Such inadequate considerations highlight the risk of unethical practices including undermining the humanity of vulnerable people. According to Clements et al. (1999), vulnerable people are those “who are stigmatized, have low social status and who have very little power or control over their lives” (p. 104). This means that, in the case of undocumented migrants which this paper focuses on, there is an uneven dependence by the group on other members of the society. This is visible among undocumented migrant communities in South Africa – the context from which I write. Such uneven dependence can however lead to the infringement on the human dignity of vulnerable groups. My argument is: beyond ‘ticking boxes’ of maintaining confidentiality, privacy, and anonymity, it is important for researchers to understand the significance of being ethical while researching.

Using an autoethnographic method, in this article, I reflect on the need to reconsider, from a deontological moral philosophical perspective, what ethical considerations are entailed for conducting research with vulnerable groups, in this case, undocumented migrants. My aim is to provide an opportunity for a deeper reflective interaction within an ethical conception of conducting research, beyond merely ‘tick-boxes’. Providing this opportunity is important for understanding various contexts. This means that enacting such reflexive practice can pave way for various contextualised ways through which ethics can be appropriately implemented. Along these lines, to provide the opportunity for deep reflection, I firstly detail my positionality, as a foreign black Nigerian African woman who has lived – temporarily as a postgraduate student – for about 7 years in South Africa.

Drawing on Kant’s categorical imperative and Honneth’s theory of recognition, I highlight the significance of viewing individuals (in vulnerable positions) with inherent dignity. Beginning with Kant, I note that through the capability approach, Sen develops the Kantian idea of the categorical imperative. He does this by explaining how individuals can achieve their ‘ends’ (goals), and so, be valued as humans through being provided opportunities to flourish. The provision of opportunities requires specific approaches or interventions during research processes. Supporting this Robeyns (2017) writes:

One could argue… that the capability approach does not focus entirely on ends, but rather on the question of whether a person is being put in the conditions in which she can pursue her ultimate ends. It is therefore more precise to say that the capability approach focuses on people’s ends in terms of beings and doings... (p. 49)

This means that while the capability approach recognises and agrees with Kant’s moral philosophical perspective on people being respected, it further draws attention to how their ends can be achieved. My focus thus shifts towards practically recognising individuals through active participation (agency) and respect. I turn to an explanation of what respect means when discussing Honneth’s theory of recognition. In merely explaining the idea of a categorical imperative (in its first or second formulation; see Kant, 1994) for ethics and ethical considerations in research, the shortfall is that methodological approaches to practically ensuring that the maxims acted on align with participants as being ends in themselves are not clear (Honneth, 1995). Kant’s ethics has thus been criticised as being unrealistic and formalistic (O’Neill, 1998).

A practical kind of moral philosophy to ethics is required; one characterised by the “principle of recognition” (Honneth & Farrell, 1997, p. 16). Honneth’s theory of recognition provides the opportunity for thinking in practical terms about ‘how’ we can ensure that the inherent dignity of vulnerable persons is respected. In bringing Honneth’s ideas together, the fact that researchers cannot analyse issues of ethics and ethical practices without considering themselves as carers, morally responsible, and having self-esteem is foregrounded. By implication, when ethics around conducting research with vulnerable groups is raised, researchers must first consider their own beliefs about what ethics means. Anderson (translator of Honneth’s [1995] argues that many “members of marginalised groups have been systematically denied recognition for the worth of their culture, the dignity of their status as persons, and the inviolability of their physical integrity” (1995, p. x, emphasis added). This highlights a neglect of, at an initial stage, the trust in oneself by researchers. Essentially, it is important for researchers to recognise the vulnerability of the subaltern and their own positionality. If researchers are reflective of their ethical status and that of the participant, they will already position themselves as caring about the lifeworld of the participant, unlike data resource.

There is room for further understanding what ethics means and how it can be translated into practice among researchers as well as improving the formulation of ethical considerations by researchers. However, in reflecting upon what ethics means, there would be a better understanding of the significance of recognising human dignity, respect, and support and care for everyone regardless of their position – vulnerable in this instance. There would also be a clear link to the need for recognising what these group of research participants value and want to achieve. Researchers need to critically reflect on what ethics means beyond ethical clearances and ‘causing harm’.

Key words: Ethics, Vulnerable groups, Reflexive practice, Research, Undocumented migrants.

References

Clements, J., Rapley, M., & Cummins, R. A. (1999). On, to, for, with – Vulnerable people and the practices of the research community. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 27(2), 103–115. https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/S1352465899272013

Honneth, A. (1995). The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social conflicts (J. Anderson, Ed.). The MIT Press.

Honneth, A., & Farrell, J. (1997). Recognition and moral obligation. Social Research, 64(1), 16–35. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971157?seq=1&cid=pdf-

Kant, I. (1994). Ethical philosophy: The complete texts of grounding for the metaphysics of morals and metaphysical principles of virtue (Part II of the metaphysics of morals with on a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns (J. W. Ellington, Ed.; 2nd ed.). Hackett Publishing.

O’Neill, O. (1998). Criticisms of Kantian ethics. In The Routledge encyclopaedia of philosophy. Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-L042-1

Robeyns, I. (2017). Wellbeing, freedom and social justice. Open Book Publishers. https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0130