Paper short abstract

This paper is an attempt to understand the causes and consequences of party-switching in Pakistan- a case that is often overlooked because party-switching is deemed to be merely symptomatic of a weakly institutionalized party system.

Paper long abstract

Party-switching is under-studied in legislative politics, perhaps because it is perceived to be rare and irregular. This paper attempts to understand the causes and consequences of party-switching in Pakistan, a case that is often overlooked because party-switching is seen as symptomatic of a weakly-institutionalized party system. Besides filling an important informational gap in the literature about the incidence and substantive implications of party-switching in a regime undergoing a democratic transition, the argument presented makes a theoretical contribution. Party-switching in Pakistan, like in other cases, is very much the product of strategic behavior by individual politicians, a calculus of cost and benefit. But because politicians act on short-term electoral gains, their switching can potentially produce changes that may change the bargaining context of the party system with debilitating consequences for both politician and regime in the long-term. These effects understood as transaction costs are absorbed by Pakistani politicians without limiting their party switching behavior. As a result, party leaders are unable to elicit credible commitment from their legislators, an important component of party unity and regime survival.