Paper short abstract:

This paper produces new insights into the critical role of local (forest) administrators in the constitution of state in so-called ‘rebellious borderlands’. Despite years of ethnic violence and deterrence, Indian forest rangers found remarkable ways to assure a level of stateness in this borderland.

Paper long abstract:

Ethnic violence has kept the Indian-Bhutanese border in its grip for over twenty-five years. Common explanations for the persistence of political instability in this 'rebellious borderland' are the lack of sustainable development and weak state presence. The politics of deterrence of Bodo and Adivasi militia groups seem to have further dismantled formal state rule. A detailed historical-ethnographic account of forest politics in the Ripu-Kachugaon forest belt reveals a more intricate political reality. Local forest administrators have proven to act as critical agents in the production and reproduction of state in this remote area. Even during the high days of the ethnic violence, the adopted politics of negotiation and selective opposition demonstrated the buoyancy of the state, both in idea and in practice. Based upon these findings, this paper urges for more careful thought on the exact nature of the relationship between the presence of armed actors, ethnic violence and the governing capacity of the Indian state.