This paper explores the role of credit in structuring the relation between rice farmers and rice millers in Gulu in northern Uganda. The analysis draws Graeber’s (2011) view that debt ties parties to each other and becomes a moral problem that structures the relationship.
Paper long abstract:
This paper explores how credit structures the relation between local rice millers and rice farmers in and around Gulu in northern Uganda. Rice millers in Gulu compete over rice supply from farmers, and therefore offer various types of inputs and services to attract farmers. Some of the services are provided for free, while some are provided on credit or combined with credit. Credit is the only way for the millers to tie the farmers to their mill, but it is also risky, since the farmers might take the rice to another miller, thus defaulting on the credit. Some farmers accept the credit offered, while others choose not to. This paper draws on Graeber’s (2011) view of debt as an exchange relation that has not been brought to conclusion. In this ‘in-between’ situation, when the debt is not yet settled, the parties cannot walk away from the relationship and debt becomes a moral problem that structures the relationship. This paper analyses how the introduction of credit changes and structures the relation between millers and farmers. It analyses how both parties view the relationship, with and without credit, and how credit affects expectations, responsibilities, and power dynamics between the parties. The study is based on qualitative interviews with both millers and farmers.