Paper short abstract:

Drawing on interviews with Boko Haram defectors and civilians who have interacted with the jihadi, the paper proposes to chart the trajectories of the political economies of jihad in Borno. It analyses attempts to rationalise jihad under the influence of the Islamic State and their mixed effects.

Paper long abstract:

While insurgencies are not economic enterprises, their political economy impacts their resources, relations with civilians and internal politics, thus affecting their performance. The paucity of data regarding the internal workings of Boko Haram feeds a tendency to confuse its factions with one another and to flatten their opposition, internal contradictions and continuing transformations. Interviews with defectors from both factions and with civilians who have had economic interactions with the jihadi, allow to chart the trajectories of the political economies of jihad in Borno. The Yusufiyya, the mass movement formed by preacher Mohamed Yusuf in the early 2000s, adapted to its turn to violence in 2009 and to the brutal repression that ensued, moving from alms-collecting to racket, and then to mass plunder under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. Shekau’s increasingly sectarian turn only reinforced this tendency. This in turn alienated civilians and fed internal controversies and jealousies. Some members tried to reform the organisation, inspired by past exposure to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and current exposure to the Islamic State. These reformists eventually split from Shekau in 2016. They proceeded to a rationalisation of jihad, tightening internal controls, cultivating better links with civilians and developing a tax system. This rationalisation has been implemented unevenly – the payment of wages to fighters was dropped, for instance, and they were encouraged to develop their own businesses. It has however improved internal stability and the resource base, and has been key to the reformists’ successes, including their 2021 victory over Shekau.