Paper short abstract:

As digitalization and data-driven technologies became the centerstage of geo-strategic competition, this paper analyzes to what extent China and the European Union instrumentalize “digital development” in Africa to promote their own agendas and assert their power in a changing world order.

Paper long abstract:

What does “digital development” mean in the 21st century international political economy? With the rise of big data and the diffusion of the “Internet of Things” (IoT), entire economic sectors and even critical infrastructure came to rely on data-driven technologies. Thus, digital development in Africa and other developing regions is no longer just about digitally driven solutions to century-old challenges such as land management, remote health services, or democratic governance. Instead, well-intended “digital development” efforts by various external actors must be reevaluated in light of Africa’s growth potential and the role of ICTs and data-driven technologies in the contemporary international political economy.

Against this background, the scope of this paper is twofold. Firstly, the paper compares the European and Chinese approaches to digital development, namely “Digital for Development” (D4D) under the Global Gateway and the Digital Silk Road. It argues that African states’ dependency on foreign finance and technology represents an opportunity for foreign actors, alias development partners, to promote their own priorities in the digital realm. In particular, China laid broadband networks, built data centers, and catered cheap mobile devices to poor Africans. By contrast, European countries were mainly concerned with implementing digital policies that would attract private investors, tackle inequalities arising from the rapid digitalization, and protect citizens’ rights. Secondly, the paper analyzes how African states balance these external inputs. By presenting evidence from a series of expert interviews with African-based academics and practitioners, the paper also contributes to the growing literature on African agency in digital development.

Paper short abstract:

In discussing the reliance of German infrastructure funding bodies on Eurocentric knowledge of sustainable urbanism, and their conflicting logics and competing interests, this paper questions the extent to which these institutions are suited to promoting sustainable development in African cities.

Paper long abstract:

Germany plays only a minor role in the "New Scramble for Africa" (Carmody 2016). Nevertheless, for geopolitical and economic reasons, Africa has become a focus of German development policy in the last decade. Financing (urban) infrastructure through loans, grants and support for German private investment in Africa is a key component of this policy. German development cooperation institutions are committed to achieving the SDGs and follow internationally recognised standards for project evaluation and monitoring. However, this paper argues that partly conflicting rationalities and competing interests within German development finance policies, programmes and mechanisms complicate efforts to contribute to sustainable development in African cities. Drawing on postcolonial perspectives on development and debates on Southern Urbanism, I discuss the problems at three levels: first, infrastructure projects in Africa that are bankable from an institutional perspective may not necessarily be the interventions that are most needed. Second, there is a trade-off between promoting German economic interests and private sector-based solutions and contributing to development that benefits the urban poor and addresses environmental challenges. Third, the understanding of sustainable urban development and the assessment of interventions follow a Eurocentric, one-size-fits-all approach that ignores the specificity of the needs and challenges faced by African cities and their governments, and fails to properly incorporate African expertise. These contradictions are also reflected in global sustainable (urban) development policies to which German institutions are committed and have contributed. For this discussion, the paper draws on academic literature, policy papers, corporate documents and guidelines, and project databases.

Paper short abstract:

This paper explores how both Chinese SOEs and private firms are situated in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and how Chinese state-business relations unfolded within BRI infrastructural implementations in Kenya, a key maritime pivot for the BRI.

Paper long abstract:

A nearly-decade development of the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative (BRI) has not led to a consensus on how to conceptualize this initiative, for which one group of scholars stipulates it as a grand scheme and emphasizes the state-led logic while others demonstrate, via scattered BRI implementations, that Chinese firms operate in a decentralized and dynamic manner to interact with host governments, stakeholders, firms, financiers, and communities, and therefore, fit in the host environment. This research bridges these two groups by interrogating how Chinese firms are situated in the BRI and how Chinese state-business relations are unfolded in BRI infrastructural implementations. We contextualize our research in Kenya, a key maritime pivot for the BRI, and employ a relational analysis approach to interpret the state-firm dynamics in BRI projects in the infrastructure sector. Overwhelming attention has been given to Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) participating in infrastructural construction in Kenya, or more generally, in Africa. This paper contributes towards a more comprehensive direction and covers Chinese SOEs and private firms in various infrastructure projects. This paper aims to gain a more in-depth knowledge of how the Chinese state and different Chinese firms co-construct China’s geopolitical BRI scheme. Data collection comes from three-month fieldwork in Kenya to interview managers in Chinese firms, Kenyan scholars, journalists, and follow-up conversations with informants after the field trip.

Paper short abstract:

This paper assesses the ‘China factor’ in the emergence of the EU's Global Gateway, documents EU-internal controversies around its strategic orientation and, focusing on its financial architecture, problematises neo-colonial continuities owing to the initiative’s capital circuits and spatial logics.

Paper long abstract:

Under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has consolidated its dominant position in various African markets, while having simultaneously enlarged its geo-political footprint on the African continent. The ‘West’ has since reacted with their own connectivity initiatives that have been framed as sustainable, more transparent, as well as high-quality and value-driven, alternatives to China’s BRI. This paper assesses the ‘China factor’ in the emergence of the Global Gateway, documents EU-internal controversies around its strategic orentations and, focusing on its financial architecture, problematises neo-colonial continuities owing to the initiative’s capital circuits and spatial logics.

Based on semi-structured interviews with Members of the European Parliament and staffers from various EU institutions, the paper first traces the origins of the Global Gateway initiative and reveals inter- and intra-institutional controversies that have characterised the EU-internal drafting process. The paper documents how decision-makers and technocrats have (re)interpreted the necessity of a global infrastructure initiative in the light of growing Chinese influence across the Global South. Pledged to receive half of total Global Gateway investments, Africa is at the heart of the EU’s emergent infrastructural interregionalism which aims at (re)integrating Africa into Europe-centric networks of trade, finance, production, consumption and technology. Focusing on the Global Gateway’s proposed financial architecture, specifically the usage of blended finance to reach enormous investment pledges intended to rival Chinese finance, the paper argues that the initiative risks to reinforce dependent patterns of capital accumulation (out of Africa) that stand in stark contradiction to Brussels' progressive partnership rhetoric.

Paper short abstract:

In light of global disruptions many countries nowadays increasingly look towards Africa. Apart from China, EU and US, more and more countries establish diplomatic initiatives with Africa. In a comparative analysis, the paper explores the economic cooperation of China, Japan and Turkey with Africa.

Paper long abstract:

As the large conferences of China, the EU and the US with African countries in 2021/22 have underscored, there are numerous diplomatic initiatives by various countries on Africa that indicate both the geostrategic competition and the increasing importance these countries place on Africa. However, the dominant focus in the academic debate on Chinese and Western activities in Africa should not obscure the fact that many other countries are engaged in Africa, developing Africa strategies and using their own institutions to intensify relations with the African continent. These countries are particularly interested in creating a favourable environment for the expansion of their own companies so that they can do business in the emerging African markets.

Therefore, we undertake a comparative analysis of the Africa initiatives of China, Japan and Turkey. We conduct a qualitative analysis of the policy documents of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) and the Turkey-Africa Partnership Summits in the time period 1993-2021. This paper explores the economic cooperation within those diplomatic initiatives, including financial commitments, key sectors and focus of business activities. The results will allow to compare the focus areas of economic cooperation, the intensity and ultimately the potential role these countries will play on the African continent in the future.