Paper short abstract:

Paper exploring how the Mineworkers Union of Zambia is responding to worsening wages, increased subcontracting and union proliferation. Examines the benefits and potential costs of the unions' plans to make itself financially independent from companies, and more controversially from members' dues

Paper long abstract:

This paper will explore Zambian mining unions' responses to the 'triple-bind' of worsening wages, increased subcontracting and union proliferation. Classified as essential workers and effectively barred from striking, Zambia's mineworkers held a fractious alliance with the state for almost fifty years. They provided the copper that defined the nation's economy in exchange for a high (but deteriorating) economic status and a (stuttering) democratisation. However, since democratisation, Zambian mine have been sold to foreign investors, and labour laws changed to allow multiple unions and (more importantly) to shift more than half the permanent workforce onto short-term contracts. Zambia moved from one mining union with (at its peak) over 60,000 members to five mining unions with (at their trough) a combined membership of approximately 20,000.

This paper will explore the strategies of renewal among Zambia's largest mining unions. In particular, it will focus upon the Mineworkers Union of Zambia's controversial acquisition of a maize mill and other smaller businesses, using a long line of credit. These acquisitions are planned to free the union of financial dependence on the companies, and more controversially on members' dues. The paper will explore the potential of financial independence to subsidise the unionisation of informal workers and to enable militancy. It will also consider the dangers of reduced accountability to members and increased entanglement with a government-dominated financial sector.