Paper short abstract:

This contribution discusses external attempts at regulating the artisanal gold mining sector in South-Kivu, Eastern DRC, and how these play out, are shaped and resisted at the local level.

Paper long abstract:

For years mineral resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo have stood out as an example of the famous 'curse', fuelling a bloody conflict in the Eastern provinces and thwarting sustainable development. Over the last decade both the Congolese government and a whole range of external actors - international organizations, governments and NGOs - have tirelessly launched proposals and made attempts to regulate the mining sector and bring it further under government's control, with a view to put an end to 'conflict minerals' and make these resources contribute to state revenues through formalization. On the ground, however, most of these initiatives have been fruitless. On the basis of case-studies from the gold sector in the province of South-Kivu, this contribution demonstrates why it has been so difficult to control this sector. We argue that external attempts at regulation fail to take into account the practical norms in the local arena. We discuss practical norms at two levels. First, there are the practical norms regulating transactions and interactions in artisanal gold exploitation and unofficial trade, which are historically shaped and dynamically interpreted by the actors. Second, there are the practical norms of local power complexes, where authorities compete to control the rents provided by gold mining and trade. An empirical study of the gold sector in South-Kivu should help to uncover these practical norms.