Paper short abstract:

This paper argues that the change of the electoral systems under democratic transitions is product of the strategic calculations of the political actors engaged in the process of institutional design, through the case study of the electoral reform during the democratic transition in South Africa.

Paper long abstract:

At the beginning of the 90's, South Africa initiated a democratic transition negotiated by the ruling party and the political parties and freedom movements in the opposition. The new institutions, or the reform of the current institutions under the settler oligarchy regime (Bratton and Van de Valle, 1994), were the key items on the negotiation table, particularly the reform of the electoral system.

The democratization in South Africa provides an exceptional opportunity to analyze the causes behind the institutional change under transition process. Following the rational choice approach, I argue that the main factor that explains the transformation of the electoral system under transition process is the strategic calculations of the actors engaged in the design of electoral system. The threat of new political parties and voters entrance in the electoral arena forms the strategic calculus of each actor involved in the process. If the threat level is low they will not change the electoral system, while if the threat level is high they will change the electoral system. The south african policymakers chose the electoral system that maximizes their electoral outcomes and reduce their level of threat.

As a result, South Africa moved from a low inclusive majority electoral system, "first past the post", with single-member constituencies under the settler oligarchy to a high inclusive proportional system under the new democracy system. The south african Constitution of 1996 opted for a maximum proportionality in the National Assembly (Lijphart, 1995).