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- Convenor:
-
Georgios Kolliarakis
(German Council on Foreign Relations)
Send message to Convenor
- Chairs:
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Georgios Kolliarakis
(German Council on Foreign Relations)
Werner Knapp (Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA))
- Discussant:
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Machiko Kanetake
- Format:
- Combined Format Open Panel
Short Abstract:
This panel aims to address contentious issues of "Research Security", including export controls and academic proliferation of critical emerging technologies, the balance between freedom of research, human-rights due diligence and the future of Science Diplomacy and international collaboration.
Long Abstract:
We have entered a new era of intense global geopolitical competition between the United States and China which is heavily reliant on the strategic use of science, technology, and innovation. Various emerging and converging technologies, including biotechnology, nanotechnology, quantum technologies, space and security technologies, additive manufacturing, and artificial intelligence, play a pivotal role in advancing the majority of the United Nations Sustainability Development Goals, crucial for a state's critical infrastructure and its ability to ensure the well-being of its citizens.
However, these technologies, often referred to as "critical" or "foundational", possess both civil and military applications. This dual-use nature poses a significant risk, as they can unintentionally or intentionally be employed for malicious purposes, such as the development of components for weapons of mass destruction, hybrid warfare, and terrorist attacks.
In this evolving landscape, the field of STS deals with a dual transformation. First, the disruption through the rapid unforeseen advances in emerging and converging technologies, which impacts the geopolitical environment. Second, the reconfiguration of the power-political context, which leads to the securitization of emerging dual-use technology R&D and challenges conventional notions of freedom and openness of research.
This Combined Format Open Panel aims to address the intricate issues referred to as "Knowledge" or "Research Security", encompassing topics such as export controls applied to prevent academic proliferation, Responsible Research and Innovation and human-rights due diligence, the balance between freedom of research and precautions against foreign interference, and the future of Science Diplomacy, international collaboration, and knowledge transfer.
We encourage contributions such as expert roundtables, workshops designed to raise awareness about the increasing politicization of international STI collaborations, as well as multi-stakeholder dialogue sessions involving researchers, science managers, and policymakers.
Submissions are welcomed from both transatlantic (US-EU) perspectives, as well as from emerging technology powers, such as those from BRICS nations.
Accepted contributions:
Session 1Georgios Kolliarakis (German Council on Foreign Relations)
Short abstract:
This framing paper raises a series of current “mismatches” in current analyses of STI governance and the analyses from an STS point of view.
Long abstract:
Recent and ongoing debates within the scientific and research community reflect the tension between research freedom and its potential instrumentalization or even subordination to national interests. This does not merely entail national R&D industrial and innovation objectives, but increasingly also deployment of research for defence purposes, and not least, restriction of research activities in order to prevent misuse of sensitive technologies by adversaries.
This framing paper raises a series of current “mismatches” in current analyses of STI governance and the analyses from an STS point of view.
First, the successive drifting away from a decade-long period of a rules-abiding world order dominated by the West, towards to a more disorderly interim phase characterised by the rivalry between the US and China, as well as by the emergence of middle powers from the BRICS and the G20 context. This development gives rise to STI alliances and clubs which explicitly fund and instrumentalise STI for military purposes, and poses difficult questions about the ethics and the legitimacy of research activities.
Second, technology (risk) assessment models seem not to keep pace with the rapidly evolving, and in the case of dual-use technologies, also blurred civil-military domains. This is particularly the case with AI-enabled applications, leading to convergence with biological, or chemical technologies, which have a much lower accessibility threshold, and a higher imminence of harm, than e.g. the small-yard, high-fence nuclear technologies in the second half of the 20th century.
Machiko Kanetake Cong-rui Qiao (Nankai University) Marijk van der Wende (Utrecht University)
Short abstract:
This panel analyses ‘research security’ from its impact on individual researchers. Research institutions should prevent the undesirable transfer of sensitive technology. Yet the calls for ‘research security’ should be scrutinized from the perspectives of equal treatment and non-discrimination.
Long abstract:
‘Research security’ and ‘knowledge security’ have been increasingly used in the regulation of international research collaboration. Research security can be described as preventing the undesirable transfer of sensitive knowledge and technology. In the Netherlands, the National Knowledge Security Guidelines were issued in 2022 for Dutch universities. In 2023, the Dutch government proposed a legislation to require universities to conduct screening of foreign students and researchers, which invited criticisms from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. Research security has also been discussed at the EU’s level. In January 2024, the European Commission submitted a proposed Council recommendation to enhance ‘research security’ within the EU.
Against this background, this panel sheds light on one of the overlooked issues surrounding research or knowledge security: the implications of research security for individual researchers and students. Research security is intertwined with geopolitical tensions, especially those between the US and EU on the one hand, and China on the other hand. In the midst of political tensions, very limited attention has been given to the protection of those individuals who may be subject to extra scrutiny on the basis of their nationality. While the European Commission’s proposal on research security referred to the need for avoiding discrimination and stigmatization, ‘security’ is often invoked for justifying the limitations on the principle of non-discrimination. The panel examines some of the conceptual and practical challenges surrounding universities in their efforts to secure research security and ensure appropriate safeguards to protect fundamental rights.
Christopher Watterson (University of Sydney) Ross Peel (King's College London) Ana Sanchez-Cobaleda (University of Barcelona)
Short abstract:
This paper typologises the phenomenon of strategic technology transfers at universities, describing seven discrete mechanisms through which strategic technology developed by and/or held at universities can be transferred abroad in the course of regular university business.
Long abstract:
As the competition between East and West regains momentum, states are increasingly regulating the export of strategically relevant technologies, ranging from methods for producing high-performance alloys to experimental data on semiconductor design to AI processing platforms. Universities, struggling to reconcile their roles as hubs of both strategic R&D and global knowledge exchange, are failing to keep pace with this increasingly onerous regulatory regime, leading to high-profile cases of universities transferring, often unknowingly or illicitly, strategic technologies abroad. Drawing on recent case reporting from North America, Europe, and Australia, this paper typologises the phenomenon of strategic technology transfers at universities, describing seven discrete mechanisms through which strategic technology developed by and/or held at universities can be transferred abroad in the course of regular university business. We then discuss university-level barriers to observing national controls on transfers of strategic technologies, ranging from pressures to diversify funding streams to academic culture.
Werner Knapp (Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA))
Short abstract:
Resolution 1540 (2004) of the United Nations Security Council requires UN Member States to adopt and enforce effective controls that also address the transfer of technology, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Dual-use export controls are one necessary and important tool.
Long abstract:
Due to the current geopolitical situation and the growing global interdependence in the field of scientific research, preventing the misuse of research results for proliferation efforts is a key concern for regulators worldwide. Additionally, rapid advances in science and technology and the associated risks have made academic and other R&D institutions an increasingly important part of non-proliferation efforts over the last years. UN-Resolution 2663 (2022), reaffirming Resolution 1540 (2004) and all of its follow-up resolutions, calls upon all States to develop appropriate methods to work with and inform civil society, including industry and academia, of their obligations. How can, how shall regulators reach out to and exchange with academia, science and research about their role in conributing to the fight against the proliferation of strategic goods, on existing threats and challenges as well as export control rules and regulations. Is it recommendable, is it necessary to elaborate globally acknowledged best practices in this important field. What are the WMD concerns of control authorities, what are the the specific needs and challenges of academic institutions in the field of export controls? Are legislative restrictions more efficient than ethically motivated self-restrictions, or is a mix between these a promising approach?