Paper short abstract:

As they are often characterized as a form of distrust towards science and institutions, our ethnographic research indicates that conspiracy theories show meaningful elements of knowledge production and political purchase that trouble the divide between “conspiracy theories” and democracy.

Paper long abstract:

More often than not, conspiracy theories are characterized as a form of distrust and suspicion towards science and institutions. Reading against the grain of such interpretations, our ethnographic research indicates that conspiracy theories show specifically meaningful elements of knowledge production. We argue that conspiratorial thinking should not be dismissed as simply the result of a cognitive deficit or categorized through the logic of traditional partisan divides. Instead, it corresponds to a specific politics of knowledge, which we call “apophenic.” Reclaiming this term out of the language of psychopathology, where it refers to the tendency to perceive connections between apparently unrelated phenomena, and to ascribe meaning to what might also be a coincidence, we frame conspiracy theories as thick worldviews that include, among other things, representations, imaginaries, values, practices, and ways of becoming social. Tracing the political purchase of conspiracy theorists as they seek revelations throughout different registers, and critically compose complex and ever-deeper interpretations, apophenic politics troubles the idea that the enemies of democracy are its aliens and should be treated as such. Conditioning the divide between “conspiracy theory” and “non-conspiracy theory” on different political explanations, what differentiates them from ideal models of Enlightened citizenship? This leads us to reassess the question as of what differentiates conspiracy theories and worldviews deemed as more respectable.

Paper short abstract:

During the corona pandemic, heterodox viewpoints on the pandemic have been discarded as dangerous forms of disinformation. Drawing on ethnographic research in the Netherlands, I show how these people resisted this foreclosing of alternatives by critiquing prevalent techno-medical solutionism.

Paper long abstract:

During the corona pandemic, different and often conflicting views have emerged about the virus and how to best deal with it. Such epistemic, societal, and economic criticisms have generally been dismissed as dangerous forms of conspiratorial disinformation that should be (and have been) excluded from the realm of reasonable political discussion. However, since these critiques of emerging hegemonic knowledge and policies often involve complex questioning of epistemic and political claims, and since corresponding plausibilities change over time, such clear distinctions between correct scientific knowledge and foolish, fraudulent, and/or dangerous conspiracy theories are not easy to draw. In fact, they can be considered political acts in these epistemic disputes.

By contrast, I interrogate these societal fights over truth symmetrically following knowledge controversy research traditions in Science & Technology Studies. How is the disinformation or conspiracy theory label used in public discussions about the SARS-COV-2 virus? And how do heterodox experts and their (conspiratorial) supporters resist the foreclosing of alternative views by orthodox experts and supporters. I draw on my ethnographic fieldwork during the corona pandemic in the off- and online worlds of people labeled as conspiracy theorists in the Netherlands, which includes the media they consume, share and produce. I show how those going against hegemonic knowledge positions invoked precautionary measures (living healthy) and a broader conception of health (including sociality and happiness). They resisted the techno-medical solutionism advanced by mainstream experts, and as such critiqued the hegemonic political economy of global public health, including the role of large philanthropic organizations.

Paper short abstract:

In this contribution, we consider a recent and troubling phenomenon: the convergence of several controversial theories around the same narrative model. This dynamic turns conspiracy theories into "conspiracy memes" and makes them more likely to thrive and propagate across digital media.

Paper long abstract:

Investigating the convergence of conspiracy theories during and around the Covid19 pandemic (Tuters & Willaert, 2022), we observed a troubling phenomenon. Rather than the creation of a "super-theory" combining arguments from different conspiratorial delusions, we observed a restricted set of concepts and actors gaining traction across conspiratorial communities. Over the course of 2020, hashtags such as “#deepstate”, “#newworldorder”, “#agenda21”, “#billgates” emerged across different discursive communities, imposed themselves as central discursive node and reshaped previously separated controversy theories around as single narrative template.

In this narrative template, the main antagonist is almost always a public and private transnational organizations, the main hero is Donald Trump or other alt-right celebrity, the damsels in distress national citizens and their traditional way of life, and the bone of contention is the original object of the conspiracy theory (vaccines, 5Gs, climate change…).

Intrigued by this phenomenon, we collected all the tweets associated not only with established conspiracy theories, but also to a series of issues that we thought we might have been influenced by the narrative template described above (e.g., transhumanism, cryptocurrencies, vegetarianism, transgender rights, smart cities). The results confirmed our suspicion. At about the same time, the same narrative of distrust seems to take hold in all these issues.

Our hypothesis is that the fortune enjoyed by this narrative derives from its capacity to serve as an expedient template for conspiratorial memes. Not unlike the image, video or sound templates that Internet users endlessly repeat and adapt to create recognizable yet ever-changing contents, the narrative architecture we described above offers a convenient way of turning different matters of concern into simple but effective conspiracy memes.

Paper short abstract:

By comparing Epistemic Injustice’s discourse and Conspiracy Theories regarding socio-technical issues, this paper aims to show their resemblances but also the key differences, therefore contributing to a better understanding of Conspiracy Theories as a whole.

Paper long abstract:

Drawing on Michele Foucault’s concepts of discursive formation and effect, and Bernard Kleeberg’s conceptualization of truth as a social operator, this paper aims to unravel the conditions of possibilities for the simultaneous emergence and expansion of two prevalent discourses: Epistemic Injustices (EI), incarnated by social movements, and Conspiracy Theories (CT), and its conspiracy theorists, both functioning as imagined forms of public participation in socio-technological controversies. The paper thus offers a comparative analysis of how these discourses “do truth”, alongside the historical and social conditions explaining their shared proliferation.

The analysis foregrounds the hermeneutics of suspicion, a concept central to the humanities and social sciences, as a common foundation underpinning both EI and CT. This approach positions these discourses as alternative modes of truth-telling in contexts where the credibility of scientific, governmental, and media institutions is increasingly questioned, reflecting a broader demand for transparency from these institutions. To add to these unsettling common grounds and features, claims for EI are often disregarded as conspiracy theories, making it all the more vital to shedding light on the key divergences between them, in order to provide a better look on what is a Conspiracy Theory. By focusing on blame, concrete perpetrators, and their punishment, CT are limited in their capacity for abstraction and their demands for change. Conversely, EI’ discourse can account for the complex nature of socio-technical issues, and their abstract causes, within which it contextualizes contingent responsibilities, and on their basis demands not merely punishment, but rather concrete and structural changes.

Paper short abstract:

Based on anthropological research of climate denialism in rural North Carolina, this paper explores the 'conspiracy theory' as a proxy concept for the epistemic 'Other'. As such, it is able to capture symmetrically the mutual mistrust between both institution and public, 'affirmer' and 'denier'.

Paper long abstract:

This paper argues that conspiracy theories represent more than an analytical preference for cover-up stories, but describe a class of thinking defined not by its substance but by its structural marginality to sanctioned (typically technoscientific) ways of knowing. Thinking symmetrically, narrating people instead by the concerns and logics they DO articulate often yields a more coherent representation. When political or epistemic authorities fail to take them seriously, it is they who assume the role of conspiracy theorist.

I illustrate this claim with anthropological research conducted in rural, conservative North Carolina; a community chosen for its characterisation by surveys and climate advocates as ‘in denial’ about the reality of climate change-induced sea-level rise threatening to overwhelm it. The research finds ‘denialism’ an impoverished term that fails to capture diverse political and environmental identities, and reveals more about climate change’s affirmers than its putative deniers. Grounding analysis instead in actual localist concerns (e.g fishing culture, political independence, and local heritage) suddenly casts regulatory science, federal government, and liberal environmentalists as the subversive Other.

The paper explores conspiracy theories as a recurring instrument of knowledge politics that shapes the performance of political participation and truth-making. It also offers an example of symmetrical research design for a discipline still lacking a distinctive methodological tradition.

I anticipate this presentation taking 20 minutes to deliver. It will respond to the open format by indulging in a style of ethnographic portraiture involving metaphor, photography, and figurative language typically avoided in academic communication.

Paper short abstract:

This article investigates the grievances and struggles for recognition underlying the anti-Western conspiracy theories concerning the 2023 natural disasters in Libya, Morocco, and Turkey/Syria. Interviews with local media professionals show post-colonial resentment and climate change frustrations.

Paper long abstract:

This academic article investigates the underlying sentiments of the anti-Western conspiracy theories following from the 2023 natural disasters in Libya (Sept 12), Morocco (Sept 9) and Turkey/Syria (Feb 6). In all these cases, widely circulating posts on social media pointed to HAARP as the cause of the disaster. The HAARP, or the High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program, is a research facility in Alaska studying the ionosphere. HAARP has a history of being the subject of conspiracy theories, having been accused of both mind control and weather modification (e.g. Begich, 1995; Smith, 1998). The claims about HAARP's role in the MENA natural disasters of 2023 have been debunked by fact-checkers who relied on the expertise of several university professors (Haag, Sept 14, 2023; Haag, Sept 11, 2023; Cercone, Feb 15, 2023; Goel, Feb 8, 2023). However, none of the debunking articles mentioned the rationale motivating these conspiracy theories. Rather than rejecting these misinformation narratives based on their “objective” truth value, this article seeks to explore the grievances and struggles for recognition that are expressed in these narratives. Based on interviews with media professionals from the MENA region, the anti-Western conspiracy theories make sense of the natural disasters and thereby reflect (1) a distrust deriving from memories of the colonial era; and (2) frustrations with bearing the brunt of climate change for which industrial powers are mostly responsible. This assessment calls for rethinking scientific categories of truth, as well as suggests alternative approaches to managing misinformation than fact-checking and media literacy education.

Paper short abstract:

Conspiracy theorists are often presented as paranoid, while understanding themselves as merely sceptical. While existing in a state of tension between these two possibilities, they are better understood as practising "suspicion."

Paper long abstract:

In an episode of the BBC's Politics Live in January 2024, the journalist George Monbiot challenged Reem Ibrahim of the Institute of Economic Affairs, questioning the hardline neoliberal think-tank's secretive funding arrangements, alleging that it is "funded by oligarchs and corporations." In response, Ibrahim branded this a "conspiracy theory." This latter phrase has long served such a function, being a convenient scapegoat with which to shield power from the lunacies of popular suspicion. Social and cultural theorists have, moreover, long pushed back against this rhetorical disqualification, presenting conspiracy-conjecturing thought as a legitimate, if sometimes abused, mode of critique. This paper represents a theoretical investigation of suspicion as a mode of thought existing between scepticism and paranoia. It aims to reframe analysis of conspiracy theories and conspiracy culture, away from never-ending debates regarding what is "warranted." Instead, it seeks to distinguish the emancipatory potential of conspiratorial suspicion from the repressive forms it often takes in practice. Empirically, it engages the QAnon conspiracy theory. While the paper resists equating conspiracy theories and critical theories, it seeks to locate both in a broader framework.