Paper short abstract:

It is argued that the debate on ‘strategic essentialism’ in applied legal anthropology is misdirected. A critical examination of the term ‘strategic essentialism’ suggests that anthropologists should differentiate between ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ in their engagement with the legal field.

Paper long abstract:

Anthropologists frequently engage in struggles for indigenous rights by giving expert testimony in court proceedings. Many of those anthropologists personally involved as expert witnesses express some form of ethical dilemma in this role. While the courts and with them the indigenous claimants seem to demand yes-or-no-statements on culture and ethnicity, mainstream anthropologists are used to deconstruct and criticize more 'essentialising' notions of these terms.

To find a way out of this dilemma applied anthropologists have mobilized the often-cited concept of 'strategic essentialism': anthropologists should assist indigenous rights movements with helpful testimony on culture and ethnicity despite some theoretical reservations - not to undermine their justified claims. Others have criticized such an approach of 'strategic essentialism' and called for a broader project: if 'the law' acts on the basis of essentialist concepts of culture and ethnicity, legal anthropology must engage with legal theory to de-essentialise legal thinking.

It is argued that, although both sides of the discussion have valid points, it is necessary to redefine the debate by critically examining the term 'strategic essentialism' itself. In the anthropological context 'essentialism' is often implicitly constructed as a 'practice of the others', while anthropology's own normativity is conveniently overlooked. Instead of arguing about 'strategic essentialism' it would be fruitful for anthropologists to differentiate between 'strategy' and 'tactics' in the engagement with the more powerful legal field. Inspiration can be drawn from Post-Marxist political theory.