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- Convenors:
-
Karol Zakowski
(University of Lodz)
Hanno Jentzsch (Vienna University)
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- Format:
- Panel
- Section:
- Politics and International Relations
- Location:
- Sessions:
- Saturday 29 August, -
Time zone: Europe/Warsaw
| Abstract in Japanese (if needed) |
Accepted papers
Session 1 Saturday 29 August, 2026, -Paper short abstract
This article considers China's emotional assertiveness vis-a-vis Japan related to the persistent and intractable issue of Taiwan and specifically what the effects of this are on Japan-Taiwan relations and on Japan’s own diplomatic practices toward Taiwan.
Paper long abstract
Taking its point of departure in the “emotional turn”, this article considers the interactive process of conflict escalation and emotional assertiveness related to the persistent and intractable issue of Taiwan and specifically, when, why and how Beijing’s diplomatic practices directed towards Tokyo and related to Japan’s engagement with Taiwan take an emotionalized form. Emotional assertiveness – where state representatives publicly express moral indignation and urge offenders to apologize in order to stop them, or to deter others, from violating China’s red lines (Forsby 2025) – has become a defining feature of China’s diplomacy. It has also been a feature of Sino-Japanese political relations, albeit to varying degrees and at different junctures over more than 50-years of diplomatic ties. Based on a systematic review of episodes since 2010 and through a discursive analysis of written sources and semi-structured interviews, the article considers the responses of Japan and Taiwan to Beijing’s emotional assertiveness. It asks: what are the effects of China’s emotional assertiveness on Japan-Taiwan relations and on Japan’s own diplomatic practices toward Taiwan? It demonstrates how issues where Japan may have made conciliatory gestures in the past are increasingly becoming issues where Tokyo opts to either wait out the episode or respond defiantly.
Paper short abstract
Despite growing attention to parliamentary diplomacy, the Korea–Japan Parliamentarians’ League has struggled to manage bilateral conflicts since the early 2000s. This study explains why and examines future prospects by analyzing post-2001 changes in Japan’s foreign policy system.
Paper long abstract
Parliamentary diplomacy has gained increasing attention as a complementary instrument to executive-led foreign policy, particularly in the management of bilateral tensions. Despite this growing emphasis, parliamentary diplomacy conducted through the Korea–Japan Parliamentarians’ League has struggled to function effectively during periods of heightened conflict since the early 2000s. This paper seeks to explain why parliamentary diplomacy has failed to operate as a viable mechanism for conflict management under adverse bilateral conditions between Japan and Korea, and to examine the prospects for its future expansion.
The study identifies the distinctive nature of historical and territorial disputes, structural transformations in Korea–Japan relations, and shifts in Japan’s domestic political and public opinion environment as key contextual constraints. Focusing on developments since 2001, the paper analyzes how changes in Japan’s foreign policy system—particularly evolving political structures, dominant actors, and legislative incentive frameworks—have reshaped the conditions under which parliamentary diplomacy operates. The analysis is based on qualitative comparative research drawing on parliamentary records, policy documents, and secondary sources in Japan.
Through a comparative examination of institutional arrangements and support mechanisms for parliamentary diplomacy, the paper assesses how existing frameworks constrain legislators’ capacity to engage in conflict mediation. It further explores the institutional, political, and policy-level changes required for parliamentary diplomacy to regain relevance as an effective channel for dialogue and adjustment. By situating parliamentary diplomacy within Japan’s evolving political landscape, this study contributes to broader debates on the conditions under which legislative diplomacy can function as a meaningful tool for conflict management in contentious bilateral relationships.
Paper short abstract
Focusing on Japan’s 80th anniversary of WWII surrender, this paper examines how selective historical memory in Prime Ministerial and party statements, and media coverage, shapes domestic debates and informs regional security and diplomacy with China.
Paper long abstract
August 15, 2025, marked the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II. Past statements (danwa) issued by prime ministers as cabinet decisions on the 50th, 60th and 70th anniversaries drew significant international attention, setting high expectations for the 80th anniversary. The anticipated statement, released two months after the date as personal opinion, failed to meet most of those expectations and was soon overshadowed by Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s resignation and Takaichi Sanae’s more assertive political turn. In the context of heightened regional tensions, particularly with China, historical narratives once again became an active component of contemporary foreign and security discourse.
This paper examines how historical memory is mobilized in Japanese political debates, both within domestic politics and in relation to Japan’s external positioning. Focusing on statements issued by Prime Minister Ishiba and Japanese political parties in connection with the 80th anniversary, it analyzes how different political actors invoke, reinterpret, or challenge earlier narratives, such as the Murayama Statement issued on the 50th anniversary, to shape domestic discourse and Japan’s regional diplomacy.
The analysis further considers how these historical framings intersect with ongoing debates on defense policy, Japan-China relations, and the Taiwan question. In particular, it examines how Chinese state-controlled media, such as the English-language China Daily, selectively cite Japanese scholars or politicians to reinforce Party-aligned narratives, underscoring the cross-border dimension of memory politics.
To better understand how historical narratives interact in both domestic and regional arenas, this paper uses qualitative discourse analysis of official statements, party documents, and public commentary. It is also informed by author’s ongoing policy and media analyses published at the Centre for Asian Affairs, University of Lodz.
Preliminary findings suggest that the selective mobilization of historical memory continues to shape Japan’s domestic debates and regional diplomacy. This ongoing linkage between memory politics and contemporary security challenges underscores how Japan's instrumentalized historical narratives influence its political discourse and its role in the region.
Paper short abstract
Why did the “comfort women” movement globalize amid memory contestations? Using norm localization theory, this paper draws on interviews and fieldwork with advocacy actors to show how memory politics localizes global justice norms in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, prompting varied state responses.
Paper long abstract
Why and how did the “comfort women” redress movement evolve from a marginalized regional movement into a global justice movement amid persistent memory contestations? This paper addresses this question by applying Acharya’s (2004; 2011) concept of norm localization to the study of “comfort women” advocacy in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Rather than treating the movement as a case of linear norm diffusion or normative convergence, it conceptualizes globalization as a process through which international norms related to global justice are reinterpreted and embedded within distinct local political and mnemonic contexts.
Empirically, the paper draws on field visits and qualitative interviews conducted at key advocacy museums and organizations, including the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace in Tokyo, the War and Women’s Human Rights Museum in Seoul, and the Ama Museum in Taipei, as well as interviews with affiliated foundations and local activists. These sites are examined as arenas of memory politics where international norms concerning women’s human rights, wartime sexual violence, and accountability for past injustice are negotiated and selectively adapted rather than uniformly adopted. The comparative analysis demonstrates significant variation across cases. In Japan, advocacy institutions localize global justice norms through oppositional memory practices that challenge state denial and nationalist resistance. In South Korea, redress claims are embedded within a strong victim-centered memory regime that amplifies survivor voices while limiting interpretive plurality. In Taiwan, norm localization intersects with postcolonial identity formation and regional positioning, producing a distinct framing of responsibility and historical justice. Across all cases, memory politics functions as a central mechanism through which international norms are localized, shaping how justice claims are articulated, contested, and institutionalized.
The paper further argues that these localized interpretations have political consequences. As the redress movement globalized through diverse local forms, it prompted varied forms of state engagement, including diplomatic responses, policy interventions, and attempts at restraint. By foregrounding norm localization, this study contributes to constructivist international relations scholarship by demonstrating how memory politics operates as a site of international norm negotiation and by explaining why transnationalisation generates sustained contestation rather than normative convergence in global justice movements.