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Since 2022, Japan has shown unprecedented support for Ukraine under PM Kishida. This paper examines Japan’s "diplomacy of sympathy," using symbolic and financial aid to defend the global rules-based order, boost its standing in Europe, and spark domestic debate on conflict response.

Paper long abstract

This paper investigates the evolution of Japan’s foreign policy toward Ukraine between 2022 and 2024 through the conceptual lens of "diplomacy of sympathy" (DoS). Centered on the leadership of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, the study explores how Japan utilized coordinated, state-level behavior to project official emotional responses—such as solidarity and a benign attitude—toward a victimized state. This strategic pivot represents a departure from the "stunted" and asymmetrical diplomacy of the Abe era, which previously prioritized rapprochement with Moscow to resolve the Northern Territories dispute.

The paper categorizes Japan’s DoS into two primary dimensions. First, expressive gestures utilized emotionally rich language to unequivocally condemn Russia’s "illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked" aggression. By labeling Russian actions as "absolutely intolerable war crimes" and "outrageous," Tokyo validated the victimization of the Ukrainian people while expressing "utmost respect" for their perseverance. Second, these symbolic acts were reinforced by substantive gestures, including approximately 12 billion USD in financial and humanitarian aid by 2024. This material backing, focused on de-mining and reconstruction, positioned Japan as a top-five donor and a principled defender of the rules-based world order.

Furthermore, the paper elucidates the utilitarian and strategic benefits of this diplomacy. Internationally, Japan reinforced its status as a dependable partner to the USA and EU. Regionally, Japan revitalized its standing in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), countering Chinese influence by deepening ties with "like-minded" states such as Poland and the Baltic nations. Historically, Japan’s stance serves as a discursive tool against Russian and Chinese narratives regarding the wartime past. Domestically, evocative language helped justify unprecedented expenditures and stimulated debates on civic duty and national defense, particularly regarding a possible Taiwan contingency. Ultimately, the study demonstrates that sympathy serves as a potent political tool, linking European security to the Indo-Pacific under the warning that "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow".

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This study compares the responses of Japan and Germany to the Russian invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, considering their post-war security identities as liberal democracies with a reluctance to use military force in foreign policy.

Paper long abstract

Japan and Germany have had many similar issues to face in the post-war period in their international relations. Both have experienced economic growth under the US-security umbrella, and both have been reluctant to abandon anti-war foreign policies. However, in recent years both countries have had to face increasing tensions due to actions of authoritarian states with which they have built up important economic ties. Although China has been posing serious challenges in terms of its economic competition and hybrid security threats to both Germany and Japan, it is Russia which both Germany and Japan have had to deal with in a more direct manner, due to its actual invasions of Ukraine and security threats to several other countries. This comparative study investigates points of similarity or difference which may help to understand how the two liberal democracies have responded to challenges from authoritarian governments in their near neighbourhoods during the time period of 2014 to 2023. The focus of this comparative study will be on both countries’ responses to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but at the same time it is also be useful to consider their parallel responses to China’s more subtle challenges under the Xi administration. The study argues that while Japan has been preparing for longer than Germany in terms of rhetoric and policy changes to deal with potential problems of reliance on authoritarian states, its precarious finances and lower economic growth mean that it has been in a weaker position than Germany to actually act on the rhetoric and respond to the perceived threats. However, both countries have exhibited caution in strengthening their security postures, based on their post-war security identities.

Keywords: Japan Germany comparative security identity

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This presentation explores Japan’s leadership on drug resistance, a major global health threat. Drawing on interviews and document analysis, it shows how Japan shapes G7/G20 agendas, exerts financial and technical influence, and strengthens its role in global health governance.

Paper long abstract

Drug resistance, or antimicrobial resistance (AMR), is often called the “silent pandemic”, threatening the lives of tens of millions worldwide. In 2016, Japan launched its first National Action Plan on AMR, emphasizing its leadership in promoting international collaboration against this global health threat.

Yet little attention has been paid to how Japan has translated this commitment into concrete actions – particularly within global governance systems dominated by the West, such as the G7, G20, and others. Using AMR policy as a case study, this paper asks: In what ways does Japan shape global and Western health policies on AMR, and how is Japan’s leadership received by the West?

Drawing on document analysis, interviews with Japanese and global policymakers, and participant observation at the Global AMR R&D Hub, a G20 agency initiated by Germany where Japan serves as a board member, this paper shows that Japan actively shapes global and Western AMR strategies through political, financial, technical, and diplomatic influence.

First, Japan’s active membership in key multilateral forums secures its political influence to set the agenda. Second, Japan provides significant financial and political support to Western-led AMR initiatives. Third, Japan contributes technical expertise in multilateral working groups that inform Western and global AMR practices. Fourth, Japan acts as a crucial bridge between East and West, gaining influence through its consistent presence at, and organization of, high-profile diplomatic events. This study highlights Japan’s leadership in global health, contributes to our understanding of contemporary Japan–West relations, and offers insights into the dynamics of today’s global governance.

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Paper short abstract

Using the strong state concept, this study examines the pluralization of refugee in Japan, focusing on country-based emergency measures. Through ISA circulars, it shows how bureaucratic autonomy is used to selectively determine who is deserving of support versus those who remain under surveillance.

Paper long abstract

Japan has long faced international and domestic criticism for its restrictive refugee policies, often described as "refugee isolationism" (nanmin sakoku). In recent years, several changes—including the implementation of resettlement and complementary pathway programs, the introduction of complementary protection, and country-based emergency measures—have emerged, characterizing what Naoko Hashimoto terms the pluralization of “refugee” (nanmin no tagenka). Utilizing the concept of the "strong state," this study focuses on country-based emergency measures, analyzing administrative circulars and parliamentary debates to demonstrate how the Immigration Services Agency (ISA) navigates external criticism and pressure. Based on primary sources, It explores how the ISA responds to humanitarian emergencies—including those in Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Ukraine—while maintaining its discretionary power.

In response to the 2021 Myanmar coup, Japan introduced an emergency measure (kinkyu hinan sochi) promising that no Myanmar citizens would face repatriation against their will, regardless of their legal status. To ensure this non-refoulement policy, the ISA allows individuals to obtain a “Designated Activities” (tokutei katsudo) resident status under specific conditions. Following the crises in Afghanistan, Ukraine, Syria, and Sudan, the ISA implemented comparable approaches but maintained significantly different conditions based on nationality. For instance, Ukrainians are treated as an "exception of exceptions," receiving one-year residency, full work permits, and social support. In contrast, Afghans initially required a financial guarantor to cover living expenses and future repatriation costs, while Myanmar nationals who failed to extend their previous status due to their "own fault" received only six-month permissions with restricted work hours.

Over time, emergency measures for Myanmar and Afghan nationals have been standardized, yet the treatment of Ukrainians remains uniquely exceptional. The ISA maintains these as country-based measures, allowing the agency to modify conditions through administrative discretion without requiring parliamentary approval. The October 2024 modification excluding Myanmar technical interns who failed to complete programs due to their "own fault" serves as a symbolic example. I argue the ISA utilizes Japan’s "strong state" structure to preserve its discretionary power, selectively determining who is "deserving" versus those who remain under surveillance. This research reveals how the Japanese state reconciles international humanitarian expectations with a domestic agenda of migration control.