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By exploring the narrative power of myth, this article will demonstrate how the recent shift from a Yasukuni-based to an Ise-based Shinto nationalist narrative is to be read in parallel with Japan's changing security policy towards a more 'proactive pacifism'.

Paper long abstract

Despite having a secular constitution that restricts the interplay between politics and religion, Japanese elected officials and Prime Ministers have leveraged on Shinto narratives as a rhetorical tool to obtain the support of powerful domestic groups. The controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo has been the focal point from which to articulate such narratives, at the same time attracting the allegiance of conservative associations and the lambasting criticism of former colonial states. In the past two decades, and especially at the hand of Abe Shinzo, Shinto nationalist narratives have shifted in favor of a mythological imagery informed by the Ise Grand Shrine. This study advances the suggestion that this narrative shift from a Yasukuni-based to an Ise-based Shinto nationalism is to be read in parallel with Japan's changing security policy towards a more 'proactive pacifism'. Against a mainstream interpretation of power as hinging on the allocation of material capabilities, this paper builds-up on the view that power structures cannot be made sense of and neither can they exercise influence outside of the narrative meaning-making behind them. Here it is argued that, differently from Yasukuni narratives, Ise narratives can leverage successfully on, and in turn reinforce, both narratives of Japan's identity as great power state and as responsible ally of the US in the Asia-Pacific. Drawing from interpretivist literature on narratives in IR and political myths, it will be demonstrated how the foundational myth ascribed to the Ise shrine complex is a powerful soft power tool that can be reshaped to suit foreign policy needs, advance efforts in constitutional reform, and assuage international audiences otherwise critical of nationalist discourse. Additionally, this contribution is aimed at addressing a literature gap in the study of IR and political myth narratives. It will show how a Japanese ethnic myth can politically resonate not only domestically or within Asian boundaries, but can also be integrated in the security standards of the rules-based international order.

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The paper flips a core premise in the Japan security debate by identifying cultural artefacts that support rather than resist remilitarisation. Introducing the concept of cultural remilitarisation, it discusses manga featuring the JSDF that challenge Japan’s “culture of antimilitarism”.

Paper long abstract

There is an impasse in Japan’s security debate, obscuring evaluations of Japan’s military capabilities at a time of turbulence and tension in East Asia’s security environment. Material-focused scholarship emphasises defence build-up programmes and policy reforms that are cumulatively developing Japan’s autonomous security capabilities to argue Japan is remilitarising; and culture-focused scholarship emphasise a ‘culture of antimilitarism’ to argue these changes are insignificant. This paper explores a route through this impasse by flipping the premise on which it rests: that Japan’s culture resists remilitarisation. Using Jeffrey Alexander’s New Durkheimian conceptualisation of societal consensus, it frames manga as important cultural texts that reinforce, challenge, and otherwise shape Japan’s societal consensus. It explores a collection of manga that positively portray Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) enactments of violence, identifying three patterns of violence: constrained, frantic, and dominant, that frame JSDF violence as a legitimate tool of statecraft. The paper thereby illustrates (pun intended) how these manga represent interpretive challenges to the antimilitarist societal consensus identified by Thomas U. Berger and others. The paper outlines a process of “cultural remilitarisation” connected to manga, introducing nuance to a key premise of the Japan security debate: Japan’s culture can support and encourage, as well as resist, remilitarisation. Moreover, it demonstrates the value of manga studies in the context of politics and international relations.

Keywords: international security, manga, militarism, new Durkheim, popular culture and politics

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The inauguration of the Takaiichi administration in 2025 ignites debates over Japan’s rightward shift. This study examines the LDP–Nippon Kaigi relationship through text analysis of party and movement documents (1995–2025), focusing on leadership ideology, mobilization, and ideological congruence.

Paper long abstract

In 2025, following the inauguration of the Takaiichi administration in October, debates over the conservative and rightward shift of Japanese politics have been reignited, prompting renewed attention to developments that began under the second Abe administration. In this context, the relationship between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Nippon Kaigi has once again emerged as a focal point of discussion. In particular, scholars and commentators have highlighted their close ties over constitutional revision, especially with regard to Article 9. Despite this renewed interest, systematic empirical analyses examining how and under what conditions the LDP and Nippon Kaigi have aligned remain limited.

This study aims to contribute to debates on political rightward shift in Japanese politics by examining one aspect of the relationship between the LDP and Nippon Kaigi through an analysis of their respective activities. Specifically, it tests two hypotheses concerning factors that shape relations between political parties and social organizations (interest groups): party leadership ideology and organizational resources. First, when the LDP president holds a more right-leaning ideology and Nippon Kaigi’s mobilizational capacity (measured by membership and number of local branches) increases, the degree of congruence between the two actors is expected to rise. Second, when the LDP president adopts a more liberal ideological stance and Nippon Kaigi’s mobilizational capacity declines, the level of congruence is expected to decrease.

To test these hypotheses, this study conducts a text analysis of official documents produced between 1995 and 2025, including LDP party convention materials (such as party platforms and policy guidelines) and Nippon Kaigi's general assembly documents (such as activity and policy statements). By tracing patterns of alignment over three decades, this research seeks to shed light on the conservative turn in Japanese political society since the mid-1990s and to contribute to broader discussions on party–society relations, mobilization, and advocacy by social organizations.

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How do individuals in apolitical organizations become politically active? We refine the Civic Voluntarism Model to understand political engagement in Sōka Gakkai. We show that it is not obedience, but interpersonal recruitment, driven by a “core group” of highly active members, that is key.

Paper long abstract

Citizen participation is the foundation of thriving democracies. However, many democracies face the challenges of affective polarization or widespread political disinterest and disengagement. Against this backdrop, it is important to understand how apolitical individuals are mobilized and become politicized. Researchers have produced a large body of literature on civil society organizations and its role in liberal democracies, addressing among others the politization of otherwise apolitical organizations. How, for example, do the rank-and-file members of religions, professional associations, sports-clubs etc. become mobilized not only to turn out to vote, but In Japan, however, much of the literature pays little attention to the importance of social context, as can be seen in publications not just on religious movements, but on other groups, too, such as business, farm, or labor networks. These organizations are often grouped together as the ‘organized vote’ (soshikihyō), with little consideration of how votes are actually mobilized, what motivates members to vote along the organizational recommendation. The assumption has often been that networks are simply tools that are used to pressure voters into mobilizing for paternalistic politicians to mobilize others to do so. This question is not only important to understand how political participation is influenced by membership in apolitical organizations, but also given the substantial decline in Kōmeitō’s voter support over the last twenty years. We reject the simplistic claims from some commentators that adherents are simply following orders and instead focus on processes of internal mobilization within the organization. We base our investigation on the civic voluntarism model (CVM) that posits that people participate in politics because they can, they want to, or someone asked them. We show how this model works in a religious setting by refining it to show that a group of people who are largely apolitical are mobilized by their fellow adherents, a ‘core group’ of highly religious and politically active members.

We base our analysis on in-depth interviews and ethnographic research conducted in the early to mid-2020s and on an original survey we conducted among Gakkai members in the late summer of 2024.