Paper short abstract:

How has Japanese human rights diplomacy evolved during the last few years? This paper aims to deconstruct the prevailing discourse criticizing Japan’s human rights foreign policy towards China. While media, NGOs and some scholars find the Japanese response weak, the reality shows to be different.

Paper long abstract:

Discourse over Japan’s position towards human rights abuse in China is usually critical. It labels Japan’s policy as „ambiguous“, „slow-reacting“, „missing substance“, or even “shameful“. Indeed, for a long time, Japanese foreign policy did not operate much with human rights or democracy promotion. The situation started to change tardily in the 1990s when Japan began to adapt to Western calls for a more proactive approach. As a result, the ODA charter, which has included humanitarian considerations as one of the priorities, has been introduced. The revision of Japanese legislation has allowed participation in peacekeeping operations. However, human rights promotion started to appear in Japan’s foreign policy reluctantly. After the massacre in Tiananmen Square, Japan pleaded against sanctions on China in order to maintain stability and Chinese economic growth.

With both Abe’s administrations, Japanese diplomacy underwent a significant shift in several aspects, including human rights policy. And while China has become central to world politics because of its rapid economic and technological growth, it has also attracted much attention due to extensive human rights abuse in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Western countries reacted by raising critical statements and imposing sanctions on China. As part of the value-based diplomacy and the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative (FOIP), Tokyo has proclaimed to be an advocate of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Thus, it was expected for Japan to take a clear stance on Chinese human rights violations. Tokyo did not release any official statement condemning China until February 2022. However, Japan has joined all UN statements and G7 letters criticizing Chinese activities and has directly questioned the situation in Xinjiang and Hong Kong during bilateral meetings with Chinese counterparts. Eventually, Japan became unexpectedly critical towards Chinese human rights violations, especially after the enactment of the National Security Law and Hong Kong demonstrations crack-downs. This paper aims to deconstruct the prevailing discourse of Japanese human rights diplomacy towards China and find out how Japanese human rights diplomacy has changed since 2019 against the backdrop of value-based diplomacy and FOIP and whether there is a different approach towards Hong Kong and Xinjiang cases.

Paper short abstract:

The paper considers Japan's development assistance to Ukraine. It utilises documentary and stakeholder interview materials to explore initiatives undertaken in the wake of 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, and how trends and directionality in Japanese aid programmes shifted after February 2022.

Paper long abstract:

After the Russian armed aggression on Ukraine in February 2022, Japanese PM Kishida Fumio promptly supported sanctions against Russia and allocated emergency humanitarian assistance funds to Ukraine. Furthermore, shortly before the conflict erupted, Kishida offered substantial emergency loans to Ukrainian government. Since then, Japan has continued its support through multiple loans and grants delivered on bilateral basis, or channelled via multilateral institutions. These measures represent Japan’s commitment to protecting the existing rules-based world order and reflect the increasing engagement of Japan in Ukraine in the recent years. At the same time, they constitute a radical departure from a (strategic) rapprochement with Russia pursued by the formed PM Abe Shinzo.

The following paper considers this momentous change in Japan’s approach towards Eastern Europe through the lens of the country’s development assistance flows to Ukraine. The paper utilises documentary and stakeholder interview materials to explore initiatives undertaken in the wake of 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, and how trends and directionality in Japanese aid programmes shifted after February 2022. The paper investigates the designated fields of Japanese engagement through ODA instruments, such as the improvement of the economic situation in Ukraine, the support for democratic consolidation, and the fostering of a dialogue for national integrity within the Ukrainian population; and contribution of ODA initiatives towards the building of resilience of Ukrainian society and institutions prior to 2022. Subsequently, the paper ponders disruptions to the existing Japanese development assistance projects in Ukraine in the aftermath the Russian aggression. Finally, it explains transition towards programmes aiming to 1) buttress Ukrainian statehood during the current conflict through direct budget support, 2) further provision of humanitarian assistance, and 3) exploration of groundwork for future post-war recovery and reconstruction initiatives.

Finally, the paper offers preliminary thoughts on potential ramifications of the upcoming revision of Japanese Development Cooperation Charter (2023) for prospects of Japan’s development assistance initiatives in Ukraine. Additionally, it assesses the pertinence of observed permutations of Japanese ODA in relation to managing larger strategic uncertainties by PM Kishida Fumio and operationalising his “Vision for Peace”.