Paper short abstract:

This paper discusses the Unification Church’s movement opposing LGBTQ+ rights and promoting "family education". Based on ethnographic fieldwork, the influence of the Church on Japanese politics and its implications for policies on gender, sexuality, and family will be investigated.

Paper long abstract:

The assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in July 2022, and media reports that the suspect’s motivations were his grudge against the Unification Church and Abe’s connection with it, have led to extensive coverage in the Japanese media on the connections between the Unification Church and politics. In particular, ties between the Church and politicians, especially those of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, have been under intense scrutiny. In this context, the Church’s possible influences on national and local policies have started to gain attention, and the ways that issues of gender, sexuality and family have emerged as crucial for the Church in the past two decades.

As the Unification Church’s anti-communism agenda lost its urgency with the end of the Cold War, the Church shifted its core political agenda to the promotion of family values and opposition to gender equality and diverse sexuality. In the early 2000s, along with other religious organizations affiliated with Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference) and right-wing politicians, including Abe Shinzo, the Church became the leader of an anti-feminism backlash, spearheading the movement against gender equality ordinances and sex education. From the mid-2010s, the Church’s attack on LGBTQ+ rights became more extensive as it led the movement opposing same-sex partnership and marriage. The Church also started to promote “family education” (katei kyōiku) by supporting the movement to pass laws and municipal ordinances to educate people to be “good parents.” The Church’s beliefs in “sexual purity” and traditional family values match well with the LDP’s policy goals of promoting abstinence-only sex education and enshrining the family as the fundamental unit of society.

Based on my ethnographic fieldwork with members of the Unification Church and other conservatives, as well as those who have fought against them, I will discuss the Unification Church’s movement opposing LGBTQ+ rights and promoting “family education.” I intend to demonstrate how the influence of the Unification Church on Japanese politics has had important implications for Japan’s policies on gender, sexuality and family, and how the Church has been collaborating with other conservative groups and politicians in these efforts.

Paper short abstract:

This paper examines the phenomenon of modern Japanese state funerals.The paper will argue that the lack of a clear rationale for state funerals since 1945 allowed the Abe funeral to become a stage for expressions of deep-seated opposition to Abe’s policies and dislike of Abe himself.

Paper long abstract:

After Abe Shinzō’s assassination, Prime Minister Kishida determined to hold a state funeral, the first since Yoshida Shigeru’s in 1967. Kishida and the LDP reached this decision by Cabinet resolution, without consulting the Diet. When opposition MPs questioned the legal basis for a state funeral and criticized the way the decision had been reached, it emerged that the postwar legal grounding of state funerals is weak. Sustained civic activism opposing Abe’s state funeral arguably influenced numerous foreign dignitaries to decline the invitation to attend.

This paper examines the phenomenon of modern Japanese state funerals. In imperial Japan, state funerals were initiated by imperial decree as a gesture of magnanimity. The rites themselves derived from Shinto and were performed in a Shinto style, and the accompanying processions included essential roles for the military. The visual spectacles created by state funerals constituted displays of imperial majesty, benevolence, and power. The paper will argue that the lack of a comparable rationale for state funerals since 1945 allowed the Abe funeral to become a stage for expressions of deep-seated opposition to Abe’s policies and dislike of Abe himself.

Paper short abstract:

Until recently, the concept of “mind control” seldom carried legal weight in a Japanese court of justice. Stripped down to its economic impact, the manipulative aspect of “mind control” had, however, already been accepted through the legalisation of another term: reikan shōhō (lit."spiritual sales")

Paper long abstract:

Despite its recent reappearance in political debates after former prime minister Abe’s assassination in July 2022, and even if it is widely discussed in professional legal circles, albeit out of court, the concept of “mind control” seldom carries legal weight in a court of justice in Japan today. In fact, since the 1990s, when it became closely associated with media coverage related to two organisations, the Unification Church and Aum Shinrikyo, its lack of legal power has been experienced as a significant problem by lawyers (and some scholars) who wish to argue for the particularity of the methods used against those who are ready to donate everything they and their families own to a religious professional. The new revelations in 2022 involving donations by Unification Church members seem to have reinforced the idea among the public that no one in a “normal” state of mind could go bankrupt due to joining a religion. However, if considered from a different perspective, the manipulative aspect of “mind control” has already, for several years now, inspired a particular legal argument involving the term reikan shōhō (lit. “spiritual sales”). Indeed, for more than two decades now, lawyers have sometimes successfully shown how the accused could employ people’s anxieties (fuan) to force them to pay out in excess. Court judgements do not dwell on victims' state of mind, and courts have generally refused to recognise consolation payment for psychological damages. In effect, judges have not accepted that it is possible to change the personality of victims, which is what “mind control” theories presume. The codification of reikan shōhō under a new clause of the Consumer Contract Law in 2018 strengthens, however, the idea that stripped down to its economic impact, the manipulative aspect of “mind control” has already been accepted by Japanese courts of justice. Suppose someone can reclaim money paid to a fortune teller over a long period because they felt they had been manipulated to believe that the fortune teller would help them with their problems. In such cases, it can be argued that “mind control” has not been absent from legal decisions.

Paper short abstract:

Literally “second-generation religious,” shūkyō nisei has grown into a widely-used rubric in media and political discourses. This paper will draw on engagements with shūkyō nisei to consider ways this burgeoning identity is shaping Japanese religion in the post-Abe era.

Paper long abstract:

On July 8, 2022, Abe Shinzō was murdered by a gunman named Yamagami Tetsuya. Yamagami reportedly targeted the former Prime Minister because he was angered by Abe’s support for the former Unification Church (UC). Yamagami blamed the UC for convincing his mother to donate ruinous amounts of money, leading to his family’s bankruptcy and decades of his own turmoil. As a disgruntled child of a dedicated adherent, Yamagami is now Japan’s most famous shūkyō nisei. Literally “second-generation religious,” and sometimes rendered as “child of faith,” shūkyō nisei has grown into a widely-used rubric in media and political discourses following the Abe assassination. The phrase represents a generation of apostates, and critical adherents, who came of age within high-pressure religious communities. In the months following the Abe murder, shūkyō nisei have featured prominently in press conferences organized by lawyers seeking damages from the UC (and other religious groups); had their testimonials broadcast in well-publicized books, magazine articles, and other publications; had their messages spread through TV panel shows, Twitter hashtags, and other media; and informed decisions made by policymakers and other influencers who are formulating legislation aimed at seeking reparations for victims of exploitative religions and dissolving the Unification Church. This paper will draw on published testimonials, ethnographic engagements, and interviews with shūkyō nisei who have been active in media and political discourses and within intra-religious disputes to consider ways this burgeoning identity is shaping Japanese religion in the post-Abe era. Attention to the people who comprise the shūkyō nisei community provides clues about how religion and debates about its place in the public sphere are likely to develop as circumstances affected by the Abe assassination continue to unfold.