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- Convenor:
-
Ayaka Löschke
(University of Erlangen-Nuremberg)
Send message to Convenor
- Discussant:
-
Masaaki Ito
(Seikei University)
- Format:
- Panel
- Section:
- Media Studies
- Location:
- Auditorium 2 Franz Cumont
- Sessions:
- Saturday 19 August, -
Time zone: Europe/Brussels
Short Abstract:
Right-minded people continue to enjoy hateful content. Why do the Japanese industries tolerate or promote hateful content? How did the industries confront themselves with the problem? This panel deals with three major industries (SNS, publications, and TV) and counterprotest against the industries.
Long Abstract:
The hate speech phenomena that target mainly Korean ethnic minorities in Japan have attracted international scholarly attention and has been a central issue of Japanese studies. Many scholars confirmed that far-right movements in Japan have declined in recent years, because far-right organizations such as Zaitokukai have reduced in scale dramatically and far-right demonstrations have considerably decreased in number. One contributory factor is the Hate Speech Law from 2016 which has discouraged far-rightists from committing hate speech on the street. The recent pandemic is certainly another contributory factor for the decline of far-right demonstrations, insofar as far-rightists did not gather in person due to worries about getting infected. Although expressions that can be obviously classified as hate speech are disappearing from the street, various forms of media continue to circulate such expressions. During the recent pandemic, especially during periods of isolation, far-rightists have continued to enjoy hateful content at home, without physical contact to other like-minded people on the street. This raises one question: Why do the Japanese media industries tolerate or even promote hateful content, although the promotion of such content might lead to serious consequences? How did the Japanese society confront itself with the problem of hateful content?
Previous research has not given enough attention to the relations between “hate” industries. Hate speakers have extended their influence by using different major media at the same time. They often pursue the following “career path”: After standing out as famous YouTubers, they are invited as guests to TV shows that target right-wing viewers. They publish so-called “hate books”, a book genre that has encouraged racism and historical revisionism since the late 1990s. Their books become bestsellers.
To answer to the aforementioned questions, this panel analyzes (1) the relation of these industries, (2) the reasons why the industries thrive, and (3) countermeasures against the circulation of hateful content. The three papers of this panel deal with different media that are related to one another: a) online platforms, b) book publications, c) TV shows.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Saturday 19 August, 2023, -Chihiro Watanabe (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg)
Paper short abstract:
The genre of “hate books” has encouraged racism and historical revisionism since the 1990s. This presentation analyses the Japanese publishing industry which induced two booms of hate books and its insiders’ stance on hate books, based mainly on qualitative interviews with 30 editors.
Paper long abstract:
In 2017, the anti-Korean and Chinese book written by Kent Gilbert, an American TV celebrity, became one of the best-selling books in Japan. Since then, the genre of “hate books” (heito-bon) has enjoyed a “second boom” (Kawai 2020). The book genre has encouraged racism and historical revisionism since the late 1990s. Just after the Hate Speech Law was passed in 2016, “hate books” decreased in number. However, the second boom of “hate books” continues also during the pandemic. How did the Japanese publishing industry induce the two booms of hate books? How did its insiders recognize the problem of “hate books”?
While the readership and rhetoric of hate books have attracted scholarly attention (Kurahashi 2018; Kawai 2020), the stance of the publishing industry, especially editors, has never been investigated, because editors of the major publishing houses are less accessible to scholars. Several academic and nonacademic articles have pointed out that the rise of hate books resulted from the publishing industry’s slump since the latter half of the 1990s (Kiyohara 2017; Lee 2017; Nagae 2019). To get out of the slump, the Japanese publishing industry started to publish hate books as a new form of entertainment (Kiyohara 2017; Lee 2017; Nagae 2019). To protest the publication of hate books, a part of the insiders of the Japanese publishing industry established “BLAR (Book Lovers against Racism)” in 2014. However, no academic research investigated into editors who have been involved in the production of hate books and the countermovement.
Thus, this presentation analyses the relation between the publishing industry and “hate books”, focusing on editors’ stance on “hate books”, the decision-making structure within publishing houses, and the insiders’ protest against hate books. The analysis is based on qualitative content-analyses of academic and non-academic literature on hate books and explorative interviews with ca. 30 editors.
Ayaka Löschke (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg)
Paper short abstract:
While online platforms announced a worldwide layoff of workers including content moderators, user engagement became increasingly indispensable. How did online platforms cope with hateful content with users’ help? My presentation analyzes the “Neto-uyo BAN Matsuri”, a hashtag activism since 2018.
Paper long abstract:
While people spent more and more time on social media during the recent pandemic, hateful content including comments and videos have posed a growing threat in the world. How did online platforms remove or fail to remove hateful content? Because major social media platforms including YouTube and Twitter have struggled with financial losses in recent years, they began to lay off 30-50% of employees including content moderators in November 2022. It is possible that online platforms will increase the number of content moderators also in Japan. In contrast to Germany, Japan did not adopt a legislation to obligate online platforms to remove hateful content within a specific time frame. Therefore, victims of hateful content must spend much time and money to identify and to sue its authors or uploaders.
User engagement against hateful content has received international scholarly attention in recent years, because such user engagement is an increasingly indispensable part of content moderation (Gillespie 2018). Users can collectively and systematically report hateful content that could be regarded as violating the platform guidelines to support commercial moderators in detecting hateful content quickly and accurately. Especially a German case study prompted scholars to theorize about determinants of such user engagement (Porten-Cheé et al. 2020; Ziegele & Naab 2020 etc.). How did Japanese users cope with hateful content?
To answer the question, my presentation analyzes the “Neto-uyo BAN Matsuri” (Internet Rightists Ban Festival), an online activism which has reported hateful content on YouTube and Twitter since 2018. It shows the main targets of this activism such as right-wing publicists and entrepreneurs who make full use of traditional and new media and identifies the determinants of the user engagement, based on a qualitative analysis of 3,821 tweets and classification of 1,038 participants.
Naoto Higuchi (Waseda University)
Paper short abstract:
This paper aims to analyze implicit racist rhetoric in Japan after the Hate Speech Elimination Act was enacted in 2016. I will answer the following question by analyzing Shin Sugok v. DHC TV: How do racists use hateful rhetoric against Zainichi Koreans in the post-HSEA era?
Paper long abstract:
This paper aims to analyze implicit racist rhetoric in Japan after the Hate Speech Elimination Act was enacted in 2016. While the law brought about the deradicalization and decline of hate groups, it is inefficient in regulating covert hate speech. Therefore, Zainichi Koreans, as the major victims, have struggled to recognize the illegality of racial discrimination in litigations. I will answer the following question by analyzing Shin Sugok v. DHC TV: How do racists use hateful rhetoric against Zainichi Koreans in the post-HSEA era? Shin filed a lawsuit in 2018 claiming defamation by DHC TV and won substantial compensation; however, the first instance court decision in 2021 did not find racial discrimination against her, which was recognized by the appeals court in 2022. This blurring of judicial decisions is due to subtler expressions of racial discourse and could be referred to as strategic racism. In this case, the TV program did not use discriminatory language but instead met the expectations of racist audiences by persistently referring to the ethnic origin of the plaintiff. In this sense, Japan has entered an era in which it is necessary to analyze implicit racial codes similar to the approach of the United States.