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- Convenor:
-
Yasuhiro Izumikawa
(Chuo University)
Send message to Convenor
- Chair:
-
Petter Lindgren
(Oslo Group of East Asian Research)
- Discussants:
-
Tongfi Kim
(Vesalius College)
Wrenn Yennie Lindgren (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI))
Petter Lindgren (Oslo Group of East Asian Research)
- Section:
- Politics and International Relations
- Sessions:
- Wednesday 25 August, -
Time zone: Europe/Brussels
Short Abstract:
This panel brings together schoalrs who utilizes Japanese and other primary sources to analyze Japan's diplomacy during and after the Cold War. By doing so, this panel aims to contribute to the debates on the conventional notion of Japan as a "pacifist/antimilitarist" or "reactive" state.
Long Abstract:
Over the last decade, the openings of previously classified Japanese archival documents have reinvigorated the study of post-World War II Japanese diplomacy and encouraged scholars to look at Tokyo's past behavior in new light. In addition, Japan's increasingly active diplomacy in recent years, symbolized by its leadership in finalizing the so-called TPP-11 after the U.S. withdrawal from the original TPP, has motivated them to understand the sources of Japan's changing external behavior and what such behavior implies for prevailing international relations (IR) theories.
This multi-disciplinary panel brings together historians and political scientists, whose works reflect the trends stated above. Panelist 1, a historian, analyzes the politics of U.S. bases in Japan by utilizing numerous Japanese as well as U.S. archival documents. Panelist 2, a political scientist, analyzes the 2006 confrontation between Japan and South Korea around the Tokdo/Takeshima, the disputed territory between the two, and considers its implications for IR theories by utilizing U.S. Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks. Panelist 3, an archive research-oriented political scientist, re-examines the Soviet-Japanese diplomatic normalization and tries to reinterpret Japan's so-called independent foreign policy (jishu gaiko).
While dealing with such diverse subjects during and after the Cold War, these papers aim to achieve one common goal: utilizing "new evidence," declassified Japanese archival documents and other previously untapped primary sources, to challenge the conventional interpretations of their subject matters and/or IR theory. By sharing this common theme, this panel demonstrates how the two trends stated above have been advancing our understanding of Japan's foreign policy behavior.
In addition, the three presenters and discussants aim to use the findings of each paper to discuss what they may mean for the standard interpretations of Japan as a "pacifist/antimilitarist" or "reactive" state. By doing so, this panel will contribute to a larger debates concerning how best we may be able to understand Japanese foreign policy in the past and present.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Wednesday 25 August, 2021, -Yasuhiro Izumikawa (Chuo University)
Paper short abstract:
This paper tries to address the unresolved questions regarding the 1956 Soviet-Japanese diplomatic normalization by utilizing newly available Japanese and other archival documents.
Paper long abstract:
The Soviet-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization in 1956 has attracted strong interests of scholars and pundits because of the significant yet unresolved issue that still hampers Japan-Russia relations today: the Northern Territories (hoppo ryodo) dispute. Scholars in Japan, Russia, and the world have uncovered the important facts regarding the process of the bilateral negotiations and the decision makings of Tokyo and Moscow by using effectively the limited Japanese and Russian archival documents, by discovering semi-archival materials, and by uncovering important U.S. and British archival documents. Nonetheless, several important aspects of the negotiations remain unknown or hotly debated.
This paper aims to address such unresolved questions by doing two things that have not been undertaken by the previous studies. First, unlike the previous studies of Soviet-Japanese negotiations leading to the normalization in 1956, this paper places Tokyo's handling of the negotiations in a broader perspective of Japan's multiple quests for the so-called independent foreign policy (jishu gaiko). The revelation of Japanese archival materials during the last decade or two shows that the Japanese government under Ichiro Hatoyama (1954-1956) pursued multiple "independent foreign policy" initiatives toward not only the Soviet Union, but also China and the United States. This paper examines how each of these initiatives interacted and influenced Tokyo's quest for Soviet-Japanese diplomatic normalization.
Second, this paper utilizes the archival documents that have been only recently classified or that have been undiscovered. The author has filed FOIA requests in the United States and obtained several important documents that, in the author's view, reveals previously unknown Tokyo's tactics of handing relations with Washington while seeking a breakthrough with Moscow. This finding is supplemented by the author's use of the newly available Japanese documents, declassified late last year (2019), that indirectly show how Tokyo tried to handle its relations with Washington and Moscow.
By doing these, this paper may be able to bring some debates on the Soviet-Japanese diplomatic normalization closer to resolution.
Ayako Kusunoki (International Research Center for Japanese Studies (NICHIBUNKEN))
Paper short abstract:
This presentation explains how Japan and the U.S. reached agreements on the management of military bases and Japan's defense build-up in the late 1950s, by focusing mainly on the defense contribution issue, in which Japanese rearmament and America's use of bases were most intricately intertwined.
Paper long abstract:
U.S. military bases in the Japanese mainland had been one of the most contentious issues between the governments of Japan and the United States throughout the 1950s. Accidents, water and soil pollution, and the deterioration of public safety in areas surrounding bases, and the negative effects of the occupation of vast areas and facilities by U.S. military forces on local economies heightened anti-base feelings among local residents. Such public sentiments in turn led to the nation-wide anti-base movements in the mid-1950s, interlocking with peace and anti-war/anti-military movements. Not only such movements but also the Japanese government's constant requests to have its voice in deciding the usage of U.S. military bases substantively undermined America's freedom of action in Japan. Meanwhile, Japan's reluctance to maintain the "defense contribution" to share the expenses of U.S. forces in Japan heightened the concern among U.S. diplomatic and military officials about Japan's commitment to the defense of itself and the West. As a result, the United States increased pressure on the Japanese government to expedite defense buildup and to expand several airfields in order to operate state-of-the-art fighter jets. Notwithstanding such significant social, economic and financial, and political costs of U.S. forces to stay in Japan, both Japanese and U.S. governments decided to keep placing the use of military bases in Japan at the core of bilateral cooperation in the late 1950s and after the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was revised in 1960. In this presentation the author explains in what way both governments reached agreements on the management of military bases in the Japanese mainland and the establishment of Japanese defense forces. By focusing mainly on the defense contribution issue, in which Japan's rearmament and America's use of military bases were most intricately intertwined, the author shows the development of "base politics" over the cost of U.S. forces stationed in Japan in the 1950s.