Paper short abstract:

In this paper, I analyse the gathering of intelligence from the perspective of its actors in preparation for the Russo-Japanese War. Army intelligence officers and non-institutional agents took part in this effort. I explain their motives, their methods, and their impact on Japanese foreign policy.

Paper long abstract:

The Russo-Japanese War has been seen as one of the first modern conflicts between imperial powers. That modernity in term of modern weaponry. But it was also a war of information. Even before the beginning of the Meiji period, Russia was considered by japanese leaders as a potential threat to Japan's interests and security. For decades, Japanese statesmen, citizens and Army Staff have felt the necessity of gathering information on the state of affairs in Russia.

If the intelligence capacities of the Army Ministry in Asia had been centred on China, in August 1879 change in the reform of the Army General Staff (1878) put a greater emphasis on Russia. The Japanese victory during the Sino-Japanese War and the subsequent Triple intervention (1895) heightened the necessity of intelligence gathering in Russia. Kawakami Sōroku, Army Vice Chief of Staff from 1885, who became Chief of Staff in 1898, was one of its forebears, along with Fukushima Yasumasa, Army Chief of the General Staff Second Bureau. They used Army resources to prepare Japan to face Russia by sending intelligence officers there.

The Japanese army wasn't the only one to have an interest in Russia, the so-called Tairiku Rōnin which I have translated as "non-institutional agents of influence", also turned their gaze to Russia. Uchida Ryōhei, the founder of the Kokuryūkai decided to study Russian language as soon as 1892. In 1895 he decided to go to Vladivostok where he eventually crossed Siberia in 1897. His objectives were to gather military intelligence about Russia. His motives were not only to provide meaningful documents to the Army, but also to promote his political agenda : urge the Japanese government to take action against Russia.

At the conjunction of social history, military history, and political history, this paper discusses intelligence gathering and its multiple facets. In this paper, I analyse the diversity of actors, who took part in intelligence gathering activities in Russia, in the period leading to the war. Doing so, I address the role of the Army General Staff and the non-institutional agents' intelligence gathering in the making of Japanese foreign policy against Russia.

Paper short abstract:

My paper explores Japan's participation in the European border delimitation process after the Paris peace conference of 1919 through its involvement in the work of the Hungary-Yugoslav Border Delimitation Commission (BDC) established by the Trianon Treaty of 1920.

Paper long abstract:

The disintegration of European empires and a recalibration of the balance of power in Europe after the end of World War I was followed by one of the most extensive remakes of the European political map in modern history. This article argues that Japan as one of the major Allied powers cooperated in the process of redrawing the new political map of Europe.

During the past decades, Japanese scholars have been rediscovering World War I as a major formative event that crucially redefined Japan's international identity in the last century. In this regard research on Japanese diplomacy during World War I represents an important area that has been promoting a moderate and proactive image of Japan's role in the international community.

In the present article, I will argue that Japan has been actively involved in the solution of territorial issues linked with the establishment of new European states after the Paris peace conference of 1919. In the post-Versailles period, for example, after the conclusion of the peace treaties, Japanese diplomatic and military officers took part in the work of border commissions which were set up to trace the new borders of Europe. In this sense, it is possible to argue that Japan participated in the process of redrawing the new political map of Europe. I believe this is highly significant. To illustrate my argument, I will present the case of the Yugoslav-Hungarian border as it was set by the Trianon Treaty of 1920. The case will be presented through the primary sources found in the Japanese archives.

Paper short abstract:

Japan's imperial expansion has generally been associated with the events after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Yet, Japan's continuous territorial expansion also occurred from 1894 to 1922. I explain the dynamics of this expansion, focusing on the principles of modern Japanese diplomacy.

Paper long abstract:

Japan's imperial expansion has generally been associated with the events after the Manchurian Incident. Yet, Japan's continuous territorial expansion also occurred from 1894 to 1922. During that period, Japan acquired Taiwan, the South Sakhalin, and, in effect, the South Sea Islands, annexed Korea, and had a special influence on the North East district of China.

The commonly accepted theory concerning modern Japan's diplomacy and its imperial expansion is that Japanese leaders found themselves in a world of ruthless competition and went along realistically with the stream of imperialism. However, leading Japanese diplomats understood the practical significance of norms in international relations, and pursued Japan's national interests, which were closely tied with international rules and norms.

Leading Japanese diplomats eagerly pursued national interests, which could include not only economic profit but also concession and territorial cession. Yet, the word interest often had an implication of mutual benefit or a spirit of compromise, and did not solely mean Japan's self-interest. Another concept on which they placed a high value was justifiability. They hesitated to make baseless claims or to take military actions without justification. However, it does not mean that they always tried to do what was ethically right, and once they concluded that they were justified in following a certain course, they did not hesitate to take military measures or to make demands on a territory. As attaching importance on the notions of interest and justifiability, leading Japanese diplomats, at least subjectively, refrained from making excessive demands in international relations. This mentality can be called a belief in "fairness." One of their typical ways of thinking based on this spirit was that if, for instance, Russia gained something in Manchuria, Japan had a right to acquire something in Korea. The leading diplomats' belief in the notions of interest, justifiability, and "fairness" formed Japan's motive for international cooperation and at the same time led its imperial expansion. Current studies on Japanese imperialism chiefly pay attention to social and cultural spheres, but this paper shows a new explanation on the dynamics of its imperial expansion with a classical approach.

Paper short abstract:

This paper will demonstrate in what way interested groups within the Japanese society—political parties, the financial community, labor unions, academic circles or civil societies—fought the war to win hearts and minds of the Japanese people in such a turbulent period.

Paper long abstract:

This paper will present the Cold War in Japan in the 1950s, focusing on conflicts over culture, norm, and ideology. Although Japan restored its independence with a strong connection with the West by the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951, its orientation toward the Free Nations was not necessarily stable: there were considerable people who aspired for neutralization of Japan or held anti-American feelings rooted in the Occupation and unequal security relationship with the United States; Japanese conservatives as well as the U.S. government were concerned about Communist infiltration into Japan's society from inside. Thus both outside powers, namely the United States, the Soviet Union and the Communist China, and the Japanese government developed their Cold War strategies targeting the Japanese, which have been relatively studied in particular in the fields of U.S. diplomatic history. This paper, in contrast, will demonstrate in what way interested groups within the Japanese society—political parties, the financial community, labor unions, academic circles or civil societies—fought the war to win hearts and minds of the Japanese people in such a turbulent period. It is indispensable to argue not only state-society relations but also multi-layered interactions among people or groups of people within the society in order to understand Japanese sense on the Cold War. Through examining psychological warfare by means of propaganda, covert operations, cultural and educational activities and publications conducted by various actors, and mutual interaction among those activities, I will show a new aspect of the cultural Cold War in Japan in the 1950s. This paper will also try to explain the process through which the norms in postwar Japan—liberal democracy, anti-militarism or pacifism—were established throughout the 1950s, going hand-in-hand with the cultural Cold War.