Click the star to add/remove an item to/from your individual schedule.
You need to be logged in to avail of this functionality.
Log in
- Convenors:
-
Paul O'Shea
(Lund University)
Karl Gustafsson (Stockholm University)
Send message to Convenors
- Stream:
- Politics and International Relations
- Location:
- Torre A, Piso 0, Sala 05
- Sessions:
- Saturday 2 September, -
Time zone: Europe/Lisbon
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Saturday 2 September, 2017, -Paper short abstract:
I explain a) the conditions under which PM Abe's securitization of the Senkaku Islands dispute were succesful, and b) the effects of the securitization moves. I also argue that securitization needs to be seen as a series of (de)securitization acts in a public struggle, rather than a single move.
Paper long abstract:
During 2014/2015, the Abe Administration implemented a new interpretation of the Constitution allowing for a limited version of collective self-defense. In order to legitimate this highly contested expansion of the boundaries for Japanese security policy, Abe securitized several security issues, first and foremost China and its behavior in the Senkaku Islands dispute. In this article, I draw upon Guzzini's (2011) argument that securitization theory should aim for post-positivist explanations through the study of securitization as a mechanism for change. Regarding Japan and the reinterpretation of the Constitution, I argue that there are two phenomena that require explanations: first, what conditions were necessary and sufficient for Abe's securitization move to be successful in the sense that the activation had effect on the public perceptions and elite ideas about security policy (explaining the securitization move). Second, what effects did the securitization move have (explaining the effects). Through a process tracing method in the 2012-15 period, I will identify the conditions under which China and the Senkaku Islands dispute were securitized from Abe's campaign for LDP presidency Fall 2012 to the implementations of laws regarding collective self-defense in the Diet May 2015. I will also point to the specific effects of the securitization moves. Finally, I will argue that post-positivist explanatory securitization theory needs to address (de)securitization as a public struggle to legitimize certain policies and delegitimize others, a struggle that contains a range of actors. One person's securitization act or speech (as in Donnelly 2015) is very seldom sufficient to understand how securitization takes place in modern democratic public debates.
Paper short abstract:
The aim of the paper is to propose a theoretical explanation for the oscillation and mediation between narratives of weakness and greatness of states - seen in Japan and in other states. The explanation draws on ontological security theory and the study of narcissism.
Paper long abstract:
Narratives about Japan vacillate between emphasizing the country's weakness and greatness. This is not a uniquely Japanese phenomenon, but autobiographical narratives of other states are characterized by similar tension. What explains the parallel nature of conflicting narratives of weakness and greatness, and hence seeming narrative instability, despite the assumption in Ontological Security Theory (OST) that state identities emerge through stable narratives? Is the answer simply that these state actors are ontologically insecure? The aim of the paper is to propose a theoretical explanation for the oscillation and mediation between narratives of weakness and greatness of states. It argues that such oscillation is not indicative of an ontological insecurity separate from ontological security. Instead, it contends that the securitization of the self as "weak" in these narratives is the prerequisite for concurrent narratives that seek to secure the ontology of the state as "great." The implication is that OST overstates the possibility that narratives can ever be homogeneous and stable, overlooking the continuous fluctuation that necessarily resides at the heart of attempts to construct identity and secure ontology. The concrete mediation between weakness and greatness does not develop along just one pathway, however. This article argues that there are at least four different and competing narrative pathways for negotiating the relationship between weakness and greatness, and hence for trying to secure a frail identity time and again: shame: pride, denial, and insult. These pathways are conceptualized based on a rediscovery of the largely overlooked discussion on narcissism in Giddens (1991), as well as on psychological research on the personality disorder in question. The paper illustrates these pathways by using the examples of Japan and the US.
Paper short abstract:
This paper traces the official Japanese narratives of 'globalisation' and 'utsukushii kuni'—and hence nationalism—to determine whether the two terms confront one another, or are complementary in the Japanese case.
Paper long abstract:
Western democracies are experiencing the resurgence of populism. Discontent towards globalisation produced Brexit in the UK's EU referendum, while Donald Trump seized Republican Party nomination. Those who failed to benefit from globalisation are shifting their support towards Rightwing parties in Western Europe, notably France, the Netherlands, and Germany. Japan is also experiencing a rightward shift; but is this due to a rising discontent with globalisation? Is Abe Shinzō's 'beautiful country' (utukushii kuni) narrative similar in characteristic to the nativist anger surging in Europe and the US? As a country that is amidst a nationalist swing towards the right, but benefits enormously from globalisation, is Japan comparable to Western Europe and the US? Or can we identify Japanese uniqueness? This paper traces the official Japanese narratives of 'globalisation' and 'utsukushii kuni'—and hence nationalism—to determine whether the two terms confront one another, or are complementary in the Japanese case. There are indications that globalisation- and nationalist narratives complement one another in a pragmatic recognition of Japan's vulnerabilities. On the one hand, Japan's economic success derives from embracing globalisation; while, on the other hand, the very economic success points to the instance of nationalist pride and anxiety which lends credence to the reproduction of the myth of Japanese uniqueness. In short, Japan might, indeed, be an outlier.