Click the star to add/remove an item to/from your individual schedule.
You need to be logged in to avail of this functionality.
Log in
- Convenors:
-
Andrew Cobbing
(University of Nottingham)
Egas Moniz-Bandeira (University of Heidelberg)
Mayuko Sano (Kyoto University)
Send message to Convenors
- Chair:
-
John Breen
(Nichibunken (retired))
- Discussant:
-
John Breen
(Nichibunken (retired))
- Stream:
- History
- Location:
- Bloco 1, Piso 0, Sala 0.06
- Sessions:
- Saturday 2 September, -
Time zone: Europe/Lisbon
Short Abstract:
Japanese diplomacy underwent profound changes during the nineteenth century. Rather than explaining these through a narrative of modernization imposed by the West, these studies of Japanese diplomats transcend conventional periodization to consider the case for East Asian modernization from within.
Long Abstract:
The changing landscape of foreign relations in the nineteenth century had a profound effect on diplomacy in Japan. Western encroachment in East Asia was rapidly transforming a regional order that now seemed increasingly untenable in the wake of China's defeat in the First Opium War. As they faced the opening of treaty ports in Japan, Tokugawa officials had to adapt to conducting diplomacy in languages and on terms never experienced before. A new, more complex network of relations with the Western powers emerged, as Japan was incorporated into an unfamiliar world order, the Westphalian system of sovereign states.
Such developments could easily be situated within a conventional narrative of modernization in East Asia, viewed as largely a response to pressure from the West. For Japanese diplomats as well, the volatile international climate certainly presented a challenging environment. The aim of this panel, however, is to focus rather on the agency they exerted in shaping Japan's relations with foreign states. Viewed in this context, it may be possible to interpret the roles played by such diplomats within a context of East Asian modernization from within, not necessarily imposed by the West.
The structure of our panel is designed to explore some dynamics of Japanese diplomacy during this period of transition. The papers consist of case studies focusing on three key individuals who - at different times - made notable contributions in this field. The first examines the experience of Tsutsui Masanori, a shogunal retainer who was involved in pivotal negotiations with Russian and American envoys in the 1850s. The second addresses the role of Sameshima Naonobu, Japan's first resident minister in Europe, as Japanese legations opened during the 1870s. The third explores the efforts made by Hayashi Gonsuke to promote foreign awareness of the Meiji Constitution during his terms as Minister Plenipotentiary in China, following the Russo-Japanese War and again during World War One. Spanning three generations from late Tokugawa (Bakumatsu) through Meiji and TaishÅ eras, these studies transcend conventional historical periodization, an approach that may suggest further avenues of enquiry on the making of diplomacy in modern Japan.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Saturday 2 September, 2017, -Paper short abstract:
Tsutsui Masanori (1778-1859) was a shogunal retainer who held extensive experience in foreign relations. By drawing on Japan's long-term friendship with Korea, his role in formulating the Tokugawa Shogunate's new relationship with the United States helped shape a new era of diplomacy.
Paper long abstract:
This paper will highlight the life and work of Tsutsui Masanori, a shogunal retainer, who lived from 1778 to 1859 and held more extensive experience than any other Japanese official of his generation in the field of external relations. His name is known in Japan's diplomatic history as one of the Shogun's plenipotentiaries for the Russian envoy Yevfimy Vasilyevich Putyatin in 1854-55. For him, however, it was more important to have served as Governor of Nagasaki between 1817 and 1821, and to have been involved in the practical arrangements for receiving Korean envoys at different stages during his long career. In this context it should be noted that although no Korean envoy was sent to Japan after 1811, preparations and discussions for a new envoy continued until the 1860s.
Based on these experiences, Tsutsui played a key role in the Tokugawa Shogunate's decision to receive the first US Consul-General Townsend Harris in Edo in 1857, and grant him an official audience with the Shogun. He made a breakthrough during a heated debate by proposing to use Japan's continuing friendship with Korea as a theoretical and practical platform for the Shogunate's strategy in opening and building new relations with other foreign powers. Indeed, the ceremony in which Harris presented his credentials to the Shogun Tokugawa Iesada in Edo Castle was conducted in a nearly identical format to those previously used to receive Korean envoys.
Significantly, Harris himself perceived this ceremonial occasion as the moment when the Japanese "acknowledge[d] the Laws of Nations" (Harris to Cass, 10 Dec. 1857). It was also the departure point in the Tokugawa Shogunate's own efforts to develop a diplomatic protocol for Japan's growing relations with the treaty powers, a process that Western diplomats in Japan recognized and contributed to themselves. This paper will assess the importance of the steps taken by the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1857 that allowed Japan to be accommodated within the international order so early in its diplomatic contacts with Western powers, and the role played by the experienced Tsutsui in enabling this to happen.
Paper short abstract:
Sameshima Naonobu, Japan's first resident minister in Europe, played a key role in the Meiji government initiative to open legations abroad. Despite outward appearances of following Western forms, the strategy was to gain diplomatic leverage and enhance Japan's standing in the international order.
Paper long abstract:
This paper will focus on the experience of Sameshima Naonobu, Japan's first resident minister in Europe, to explore a pivotal moment in Meiji diplomacy, the opening of legations abroad. Japanese envoys had already started venturing overseas in the last years of Tokugawa rule, to ratify treaties or negotiate questions on open ports and borders. American and French officials were even appointed as consuls to represent Tokugawa interests in San Francisco and Paris. Yet not until 1871 did permanent missions appear, as legations were established in foreign capitals, housing Japanese resident ministers and their staff.
It marked the onset of a proactive strategy of engagement that, already by the end of the decade, led to Japanese legations opening across Europe from St Petersburg to Madrid. This was a striking departure given Japan's reputation for keeping the West at arm's length. Furthermore, the concept of resident ambassador - first developed in Renaissance Europe - was still culturally unfamiliar beyond the Western world. Japan's new network of legations was the most dynamic example among several comparable initiatives taken by non-Christian states such as the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and subsequently China and Siam. Collectively, these contributed to reshaping the field of diplomacy itself at a formative stage in the evolution of the international order.
By charting the transition from sending visiting envoys to establishing permanent missions, this paper highlights the cultural barriers faced by non-Christian representatives in gaining acceptance within the diplomatic corps in Europe. In 1871, for example, Sameshima arrived in London only to have his credentials refused by the Foreign Office, so Japan's first legation in Europe was opened in Paris instead. Intrigued by the unwritten assumptions he found encoded in the culture of the diplomatic corps, he embarked on a detailed analysis of this particular social universe. His research was not just an exercise in cultural borrowing, however; beyond any outward appearance of subscribing to Western modes of diplomacy, Sameshima's underlying agenda was to enhance Japan's prestige abroad, and subvert the asymmetric pattern of diplomatic relations hitherto dominated by representatives of the treaty powers in Japan.
Paper short abstract:
Hayashi Gonsuke served as Japan's minister in Peking twice, once to the Qing Empire and then to the newly-founded Republic. Although he argued for autonomous Chinese state formation from within, his work in practice failed to dispel suspicions about his allegedly imperialist agenda.
Paper long abstract:
In Hayashi Gonsuke's (1860-1939) long diplomatic career spanning nearly four decades, his postings as Minister of Japan to China do not seem to merit special attention. After six years spent in Korea, during which he played an important role in making Korea a protectorate of Japan, his subsequent post of less than two years as a minister to the Qing Empire from 1906 to 1908 would appear to be a mere transitory phase. Equally, the two years of his second posting to Peking, as a Minister to the Republic of China from 1916 to 1918, seem like a short transition between longer postings to Italy and to Great Britain.
Yet, Hayashi served as Japan's minister at Peking during crucial times for China as well as for Sino-Japanese relations. This paper intends to shed light on these short but important phases of Hayashi's life by tracing his role in shaping Sino-Japanese relations and his part in the China's transition to a constitutional mode of government. Using Japanese, Chinese and European sources, this paper plans to show the complexities of Japanese diplomacy in China in the first two decades of the 20th century.
Serving in Peking during the last years of Manchu rule and then in the first years of the Republic, Minister Hayashi tried to foster contacts with as many Chinese leaders as possible amidst a volatile political environment. Tending to be "oysterlike secretive" towards his European counterparts, Hayashi was well aware of the special position of Sino-Japanese relations, and argued for a policy by which Japan would act as a kind of mentor for the modernisation of China. In his view, the building of a modern Chinese nation-state should take place from within, following an autonomous line of development. However, he was also operating under difficult conditions, and in practice his work can be seen to be have been ambiguous. The signals he sent were inconsistent, and he was unable to dispel suspicions about his underlying intentions, in particular doubts that he was actually promoting the interests of Japanese imperialism.