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- Convenor:
-
Mark Mullins
(University of Auckland)
Send message to Convenor
- Discussant:
-
Ian Reader
(University of Manchester)
- Stream:
- Religion and Religious Thought
- Location:
- Torre A, Piso 0, Sala 02
- Sessions:
- Saturday 2 September, -
Time zone: Europe/Lisbon
Short Abstract:
The issue of constitutional revision has reappeared since PM Abe's return to LDP leadership in 2012. This panel will consider the debate surrounding proposed revisions to articles of particular concern to organized religions (20, 89, and 9).
Long Abstract:
On 15 December 1945, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) issued the "Directive for the Disestablishment of State Shinto" and set in motion policies that effectively reduced Shinto to the status of a voluntary organization. Articles 20 and 89 of the postwar Constitution (1947) redefined the relationship between the state and religion (i.e., separation) and the rights of individuals to freely practice (or not) a religion of their choice. Many religious organizations, particularly those that suffered under Japan's prewar regime, welcomed these changes, but critics maintained that the postwar Constitution and Occupation policies were based on "victor's justice" and unfairly reduced the role of Shinto in public life and institutions. Throughout the postwar period, religious and political leaders have advocated for revisions of the Constitution that would restore the place of Shinto.
The issue of constitutional revision has become a focus of serious concern again since Prime Minister Abe Shinzō resumed leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party in 2012. The papers in this panel will critically engage the debate surrounding revisions proposed by the LDP to articles of particular concern to organized religions (20, 89, and 9). Helen Hardacre will examine the verdicts in two 2010 lawsuits related to public (municipal) support for Shinto rites and institutions, which will reveal why some government officials and Shinto leaders are in favor of the proposed revisions. Mark Mullins will review the impact of the revision of the Fundamental Education Law (2006) and the government's implementation of patriotic education, which provide precedents and evidence for why some religious and secular leaders oppose revisions. Levi McLaughlin's paper will focus on the role of Komeito, a key partner in the coalition government. He will consider how members of Soka Gakkai, the Buddhism-based religion that propels Komeito, are responding to the LDP's proposed amendment of the "peace clause" Article 9, and how Komeito defense of Article 9 connects to the party's support for recent security legislation.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Saturday 2 September, 2017, -Paper short abstract:
Examination of two 2010 Japanese Supreme Court cases regarding separation of religion from state reveals that government officials routinely use public resources to support Shinto ceremonies.
Paper long abstract:
The 1977 Supreme Court verdict in Tsu City Grounds Purification case (discussed by Mark Mullins) introduced an important distinction between religious and customary ceremonies that allows local governments to use public funds to conduct Shinto ceremonies. The Tsu City case was particularly significant in opening a postwar role for Shinto ritual and in rekindling images of Shinto as fundamentally different from religion.
This paper examines two subsequent Supreme Court verdicts from 2010 that, like the Tsu City case, bear on separation of religion from state (article 20) and article 89, which bans public expenditures for religious ceremonies, one from Sunagawa City (Hokkaidō Prefecture) and the second from Hakusan City (Ishikawa Prefecture). The first arose when a Christian in Sunagawa City brought suit against the city for allowing a shrine to exist on public land without requiring it to pay rent. The city owned land where a meeting hall had been built with public funds, and a small shrine called the Sorachita Jinja had been moved into the building. The suit charged that this situation constituted a violation of article 89. The second case arose after the mayor of Hakusan City attended a party held by the supporters’ group (Hōsankai) of Hakusan Hime Shrine, which was celebrating its 2100th Annual Festival. The party was not held at the shrine, nor did it involve Shinto ceremonies. Because the mayor used his official car and took his official secretary to the party, the suit charged the mayor with violating article 89.
Evidence presented in these two cases revealed a high level of involvement by public officials in shrine affairs and the complexities of popular attitudes towards shrines. The contradictory verdicts in the two cases suggest that Japanese legal thinking remains fluid and unresolved in dealing with the consequences of the Tsu City case, and in clarifying the status of Shinto with respect to constitutional provisions regarding religion.
Paper short abstract:
This paper considers the concerns of religious minorities over proposed revisions to Articles 20 and 89 in light of the impact of the Fundamental Education Law revision in 2006.
Paper long abstract:
Over the past two decades, the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party has passed legislation to restore and strengthen patriotic education in public schools, promoted official visits to Yaskuni Shrine, and has recently resumed efforts to revise the Constitution. This paper considers the proposed revisions to Articles 20 and 89 in light of recent developments in public education.
The restoration of patriotic education is closely related to the legislation passed by the Diet in 1999, which made the Kimigayo (national anthem) and Hinomaru (national flag) the “official” symbols of Japan, and the revision of the Fundamental Education Law (Kyōiku kihon hō) in 2006, which reinserted patriotic moral education into public schools and led to the requirement that teachers lead students in singing the national anthem for official school ceremonies. In 2011, the Supreme Court determined that the new school policy was “constitutional.” While those imposing the new patriotic rituals do not regard them as “religious,” some of those forced to participate regard them as oppressive and linked to the wartime system that required public school teachers to participate in rituals of respect toward the Imperial Rescript of Education, sing the national anthem, and visit Shinto shrines (sanpai).
Articles 20 and 89 in their current form guarantee religious freedom and prohibit any state support or coercion with respect to religion. The draft proposal by the LDP adds a qualifying phrase, which prohibits any state support for religious activities that “transcend customary practices” (shūzokuteki kōi). Religious minorities are concerned that this redefinition would provide a legal basis for requiring children and teachers at schools, as well as employees at government institutions, to participate in jinja sanpai as a part of their civic duties. Furthermore, the revision could legalize and normalize official visits (kōshiki sanpai) to Yasukuni Shrine re-defined as a “social” or “national ritual.” Those opposed are convinced that the revision will reintroduce the notion of “non-religious Shinto,” which will further erode individual freedom and lead to increased coercion in public institutions.
Paper short abstract:
This paper draws on ethnographic research on Soka Gakkai to portray how member support of Komeito has changed in response to the party’s shifting policies vis-à-vis the Japanese Constitution.
Paper long abstract:
Komeito, the “Clean Government Party,” operates as the junior partner to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan’s governing coalition. It is best known as a political party founded by Soka Gakkai, a Nichiren Buddhism-based New Religion that claims millions of adherent households in Japan. Soka Gakkai founded Komeito in 1964 and the religion and the party separated officially in 1970. Recent decades have seen progressive differentiation between the two organizations, yet Gakkai members in Japan nonetheless continue to treat electioneering on behalf of Komeito (and, since 1999, LDP partners) as a component of their religious practice.
Critics have focused recently on new strains that have developed between the religion and the party. Komeito was founded by Soka Gakkai on pacifist principles, and Gakkai members continue as peace activists even as they electioneer on behalf of a party that supported a Cabinet decision that permitted “collective self-defense” (shūdanteki jieikan) in 2014 and voted in favor of security laws in 2015 that reinterpret Article Nine, the Japanese Constitution’s “peace clause,” that may allow Japanese troops to serve in combat overseas. The party’s reversals have occasioned diverse reactions from their Gakkai supporters – from enthusiastic support, to qualified rationales that rely on innovative doctrinal justifications, to rebuke of Komeito, both publicly and more quietly within local Gakkai communities.
This paper draws on ethnographic investigations among Soka Gakkai members, and from materials produced by Komeito representatives, to portray how member support of Komeito has transformed as the party’s policies vis-à-vis the Japanese Constitution have shifted. It takes into account Komeito engagement with draft revisions to the Constitution proposed by the LDP in 2012 as it surveys Komeito’s changing Constitution-related stances. By placing Komeito’s recent policy shifts into a historical progression, through understanding ways Komeito politicians strategize within the coalition under LDP leader Abe Shinzō, and by taking into account concomitant changes in attitudes on the part of Gakkai voters, we can better understand the current Komeito stance on Constitutional revision and ways Soka Gakkai voters may ultimately sway government action on this issue.