Paper short abstract:

I explore the institutional dynamics affecting land governance in relation to revenue collection by comparing cases of Zambia and Sierra Leone. I argue for reshaping hegemonic notions of land and property rights in contexts where land is held collectively, and managed by customary institutions.

Paper long abstract:

This paper, drawing from my PhD thesis, conceptualises the puzzle of taxing properties on customarily held land. It argues that the problem of competition for tax legitimacy at sub-national levels in several Sub-Saharan African countries is further compounded by the fact that land is held customarily. The problem of raising revenues from land and property in this context is therefore a distinctive question presenting obstacles that require a specific analytical approach. This approach conceptualises the ownership of property, or property rights, in these customarily held lands, and highlights the distinctions from more traditional notions of land ownership. In doing so, it brings about the main features of existing land systems that are direct descendents of colonial structures. The paper applies a comparative lens to the cases of Zambia and Sierra Leone to substantiate its core argument. These countries, share institutional history as former British colonies, and present similarly structured parallel political institutions that operate at the sub-national level. Within both countries, these institutions often compete on issues around land reform and revenue collection. Both countries are currently considering reforms impacting property taxation on customary lands. The findings highlight central challenges: obtaining citizen support for land and property taxes which are historically absent in customary lands; limited engagement between citizens and agents of the formal state; and the risk of property tax reform undermining the vital role that traditional political instititutions play in maintaining the relationship between communities and their lands.