Paper short abstract:

It pertains to the customary leaders' strategy of appearing 'complementary to the statist decision'. However, they later overturned the decision. Using Levitsky and Helmke's concept of the formal-informal institutional relationship, I will explain this phenomenon as accommodating.

Paper long abstract:

I will utilise an empirical case in the Lospalos district of Timor-Leste so as to illustrates how the design of land institutions may exacerbate land disputes. As argued by Mamdani (1996), colonial regimes invented ‘neo’customary institutions, and postcolonial regimes sustained or expanded the role of neocustomary leaders in rural Africa, resulting in a prolonged and prevalent ‘bifurcate’ system. Timor-Leste, under Portuguese rule, experienced a similar situation where the liurai family became the Xefe Suku. Together with another traditional authority known as the lia na’in who is in charge of legal matter in the Suku level, they constitute a neocustomary institution, addressing various issues, such as land disputes within families or between different families.

However, as revealed by Cummins and Leach (2012), the Timorese bifurcate system is integrated into one, following the concept of ‘climbing a ladder’. At the lower level of the ladder, neocustomary institutions operate; if they fail to address problems, these issues can be escalated to the higher level of the ladder – statist institutions, such as the court.

During my fieldwork, I wondered whether the lia na’in’s decision could actually be denied by the formal sector such as courts. The climbing design of land institutions from neocustomary to statist seems well-structured, with each level respecting the other and providing what appears to be fairer opportunities to receive (para)legal service. However, de facto, what the neocustomary leaders in the case were doing was ‘accommodating’; they awaited an opportunity to overturn the decision while seemingly respecting the court’s ruling.