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Accepted Paper:

Strained Relations: The Ghanaian State and Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners (ASM)  
Isaac Haruna Ziaba (London School of Economics)

Paper short abstract:

This paper explains failed attempts by the Ghanaian state to clamp down on ASM. It argues that Ghana's competitive political configuration and the patron-client networks of ASM operatives shape the state's penchant to clampdown on ASM and its repeated failure in doing so.

Paper long abstract:

This paper explains the conflictual relations between the Ghanaian state and artisanal and small-scale miners (ASM).

Despite Ghana's democratic consolidation, the state clamps down on its ASM sector with little or no success contrary to our theoretical priors.

The paper argues that Ghana's competitive political configuration and the patron-client networks of ASM operatives respectively explain the state's penchant to clampdown on ASM and its repeated failure in doing so.

The country's competitive political configuration affords Large Scale Mining (LSM) companies significant 'holding powers' with which they play one political authority against the other and, thus, shape the state's clampdown measures. These measures then, seemingly, guarantee the protection of LSM investments against invasion by ASM operatives.

Moreover, the existing political configuration implies that governments choose clampdown policies for instrumental reasons. First, the mass media campaign against ASM-induced environmental degradation increases incumbents' risk of future electoral defeat, making clampdown measures preferable.

Second, clampdown measures become subtle means by which incumbents weaken the financial base of opposition via targeting ASM operatives deemed to be opposition financiers.

This half-hearted manner in which governments clamp down on ASM, to a lesser extent, explains why such clampdown strategies fail. More importantly, however, artisanal miners undermine clampdown measures through their complex web of patronage networks with a host of powerful sub-national actors, including traditional authorities and special security task-force charged with clampdown responsibilities.

This argument sheds light on the political settlement, state-business relations, and patron-client relations pieces of literature.

Panel P03
Leadership in and for natural resource management
  Session 2 Friday 19 June, 2020, -