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F07
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The politics of inequality: exploring the role of corruption and governance
Short Abstract:
This panel focuses on the role of governance structures in perpetuating or bridging inequalities in less developed economies. The role of differing forms of corruption in particular is highlighted. The panel targets papers that approach the governance-inequality nexus from diverse perspectives.
Long Abstract:
Institutions have long been recognised as crucial in addressing differing forms of inequalities. In contexts where existing governance structures widen rather than bridge the gaps of inequality, an even greater problem exists. In some instances, the existence of social, economic and political inequalities also creates a vicious cycle of unequal access to resources and partiality in the distribution of public goods and services. This creates an economy with inherent biases in its governance structures which leads to widening of the pre-existing inequality gaps. To obturate these gaps, several approaches at the micro, meso and macro levels can be employed. This panel welcomes papers that interrogate governance and inequalities using different theoretical and empirical approaches. We particularly encourage the use of more holistic approaches that analyse the governance-inequality from different analytical lenses and also cut across different disciplines.
Accepted papers:
Session 1
Patronage, Perceived Property Rights and Persistence of slums
Abodh Kumar
(LSE & Central University of South Bihar)
Paper short abstract:
This study endeavours to answer the question: Why do slums persist? The paper argues that disappearance of slum attributes through effective formal institutional intervention through provision of legal land tenure and improvement in the local level of governance.
Paper long abstract:
This study endeavours to answer the question: Why do slums persist? The paper identifies the persistence of slums with the persistence of slum attributes that are included in definition of a slum. Small city slums have been largely overlooked in the existing literature on urbanization. The paper utilises primary data collected from 184 households present in the slums of Gaya, a city of Bihar in India, where persistence of slums is a bigger issue than new slum formation. Econometric results testing a causal model suggest that whereas patronage and corruption within the structure of governance assist in the withering away of slums, the discretionary allocation of public resources appears to sustain the persistence of slums. Our results reveal that perceived legal ownership of illegally occupied residential space and prolonged stay at the same location assist in dissolution of slums. On the contrary, slum dwellers' prolonged stay at a specific location helps adaptation to the life of slums. The paper argues that disappearance of slum attributes through effective formal institutional intervention through provision of legal land tenure and improvement in the local level of governance can act as potential catalyst towards the endeavour to de-slum a city.
Australian scholarships to Cambodia: who gets them and what do they learn?
Kongkea Chhoeun
(Australian National University)
Paper short abstract:
This paper studies the impact of OECD aid on democracy and governance in the recipient countries.
Paper long abstract:
Australia has been providing scholarships to foreign countries' citizens to study in Australia for several decades. Despite its long history, little is known about who gets them and what influences these scholarships have on the recipient countries' citizens. This paper attempts to answer the following two questions: Who are selected? and What impact do Australian scholarship programs have on Cambodian students' political attitudes? Methodologically, I employed online and face-to-face surveys to understand who is selected and a before and after, quasi-experiment without pre-measurement and an in-depth, semi-structured interview research design to identify causal one-year effects of the programs. Overall, contrary to common assumptions about Australian aid, first, I found no evidence that Australian scholarship programs excessively benefited the elites and that the programs had been exploited for political ends by Cambodia's ruling elites. Second, however, the programs have either reinforced or slightly increased Cambodian scholars' support for democracy, the free-market economy and the elimination of corruption. Finally, Cambodian scholars became more positive about Australia as a consequence of the programs; however, the programs have insignificant influences on their support for Australian development model. This paper helps fill gaps in our understanding of the impact of OECD aid on democracy and governance in the recipient countries.
Corruption and Inequalities of social capital; Can human agency play a role?
Davina Osei
(Leiden University)
Paper short abstract:
Unequal access to social networks in particular, and social capital in general, has the potential of increasing corruption proclivities. However, the level of human agency an individual exhibits can be substituted for the inequality of social capital and its effects on corruption.
Paper long abstract:
We examine the role of differing levels of social capital and human agency in shaping corruption proclivities. We use data from the World Values Survey and other data sources for 308, 901 individuals from 98 countries employing a multilevel modelling approach. We find that, though social structures have an influence on individual corruption proclivities, an increase in the agency of individuals alter how these social structures affect corrupt behaviours of individuals. Individuals with either high levels of agency or low intensity of connections within their (multiple) networks tend to be less likely to develop a proclivity towards corruption. Also, no social network structure (either bonding or bridging) is particularly more benign than the other. What matters for corrupt behaviours is the intensity of connections within a network which has the tendency to breed in-group loyalties and particularism leading to partiality, hence increasing corrupt behaviours.