Paper short abstract

This paper tests if partisan alignment exists in the allocation of funds for India's largest social protection programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in the state of West Bengal, India, and whether incumbent local governments gain electorally in the practise of partisan alignment.

Paper long abstract

Do ruling parties positively discriminate its own constituencies in allocating public resources? If they do, do they gain electorally in engaging in such a practice of partisan alignment? This paper tests whether partisan alignment exists in the allocation of funds for India's largest social protection programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in the state of West Bengal in India, and whether incumbent local governments (village councils) gain electorally in the practise of partisan alignment. Using a quasi-experimental research design in the form of Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design, we find that the village council level ruling-party spends significantly more in their own party constituencies as compared to opponent constituencies. We also find strong evidence of electoral rewards in the practise of partisan alignment in distribution of NREGS funds. However, we find that the results differ between the two main ruling political parties at the village council level in the state.