Paper short abstract:

Ecuador experienced a wave of policy change from 2007 onwards. The internal organization of the ruling party facilitated policy change, in spite of internal differences. The bargaining strategies of the executive and the mechanisms of policy discussion secured support for the executive’s agenda.

Paper long abstract:

From 2007 onwards, Ecuador experienced a substantial wave of policy changes not seen before, at least from its democratic transition. How did the executive managed to be a successful policymaker in a country known for its chronic deadlock? The existence of a large and disciplined party controlling the executive and congress appears to be a key element behind the country's wave of policy change. However, it is not clear how the ruling party achieved high levels of voting unity, considering the policy differences among its coalitions. Based on in-depth interviews to current and former legislators, and former members of the country's latest Constitutional Assembly, this paper presents results that point to the organization of the ruling party as a mechanism that reduced the transaction costs of policy change. Specifically, the paper presents stylized models of the party-in-congress that show how the bargaining strategies of the executive, and the mechanisms that the ruling party used to discuss policy proposals, helped the executive secure support for his policy agenda. Moreover, the party organized support for the executive while keeping to a minimum policy concessions.