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- Convenors:
-
Barbara Harriss-White
(Oxford University)
Lucia Michelutti (University College London)
- Location:
- Room 8 (Examination Schools)
- Start time:
- 14 September, 2016 at
Time zone: Europe/London
- Session slots:
- 1
Short Abstract:
While South Asian development is mediated through relations between the state, capital and crime and between individuals in politics, the bureaucracy and the illegal economy, this panel explores the phenomenon of bossism and development with wider comparisons.
Long Abstract:
Grounded in systematic corruption, economic accumulation and physical violence, the politics of 'criminal' bosses are popularly known in the South Asian region as 'mafia raj', 'goonda raj' or 'mastanocracy' 'the rule by mafia' or 'rule by criminals'. Such terminologies are interchangeably used to express popular visions of the relations between the state, capital and crime and between individuals in politics, the bureaucracy and the illegal economy.
The South Asian term 'mafia' is also employed to refer to organised crime at large and to refer to business enterprises that seek to monopolise particular trades through extra-legal and violent means. 'Mafia Raj' shares similarities with Caciques and Caudillos in Latin America, Mafiosi in Italy, urban political machines in the United States, and today's gangster politics in Indonesia, Russia, Thailand, Bulgaria, Turkey and Brazil.
Democratic participation does not translate into accountable states, on the contrary. Systems of 'Mafia Raj' have led directly to the dispossession and precarisation of large sections of society which are kept increasingly under pauperised and uncertain living conditions. Yet much literature on development and poverty assumes that laws, policies and high levels of political participation can address human development.
We welcome comparative discussion on the relation between crime and democratic politics, and are interested in papers on South Asia and beyond that resent new evidence and data on how these processes and debates are unfolding in particular, local contexts.
Accepted papers:
Session 1Paper short abstract:
Presentation book manuscript 'Mafia Raj': The rule of Bosses in South Asia' by Lucia Michelutti, Ashraf Hoque, Nicolas Martin, David Picherit, Paul Rollier, Aril Ruud and Clarinda Still.
Paper long abstract:
Through 'the figure of the boss', we map out ethnographically how bosses and aspiring bosses rule; their statecraft techniques and contingent legitimaties across India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. We highlight local spheres of criminality and their relations (or autonomy) with formal politics in seven settings. In the talk we argue that a focus on the 'de facto' micro-dynamics of (criminal) power (rather than on 'state effects' and 'discourse of corruption') unravels how bosses exercise control over people's lives; the systems of intimidation and uncertainty they create; and help to shed light on the opportunities and fantasies of power that such systems forge. In particular we focus on the impacts of bossism on the everyday lives of citizens and discuss how and why 'Mafia Raj' regimes remain largely uncontested and go hand in hand with competitive electoral democracies and high level of popular political participation.
Paper short abstract:
Here four case studies: illegal coal; a century of fire; Himalayan water; and deltaic sand show that state- and central-level party politics need re-assessment in the light of the relations between criminal activity and parties. .
Paper long abstract:
.The regulation of natural resource extraction and use is widely
understood to be weakly enforced by the Indian state.
Less attention has been paid to the relationships between
the flouting of laws regulating natural resources and party political
funding and behaviour. Four case studies: illegal coal; a century of fire;
Himalayan water; and deltaic sand show that state- and central-level
party politics need re-assessment in the light of these relationships.
Paper short abstract:
This presentation examines the nature of urban order in Bangladesh. It explores the significance of gangsters, party politics, and how people improve their status by demonstrating the capacity for violence.
Paper long abstract:
Urban Bangladesh has seen radical change over the past decade. From being dominated by entrepreneurial gangsters, often known locally as mastan, it is now more explicitly controlled by wings of the ruling party. In many ways party figures have simply replaced the gangsters at lower levels, mediating access to work and services, operating extortion networks and illegal businesses. But this party politicisation of urban life has also brought a greater degree of stability to the social order. This presentation will make these arguments through recent ethnographic research from a large, and infamous, market place at the centre of Dhaka. It will sketch the rise and fall of a prominent local gangster, and examine the significance of party politics today. Studying a group of labourers, it will also explore how people negotiate their place within this order, rising in status through demonstrating the capacity for violence.
Paper short abstract:
Focusing on Punjab, Pakistan, this paper argues that a deeper understanding of the factors underpinning specific patterns of bureaucratic appointment is essential for those seeking to understand specific patterns of governance.
Paper long abstract:
This paper argues that understanding patterns of bureaucratic appointment allows for a deeper understanding of patterns of governance. Tracing the appointment/promotion/transfer of senior and mid-tier bureaucrats in Pakistan through legal, extra-legal, and illegal means, I argue that many politicians and bureaucrats face incentives to manipulate the appointment process. This paper provides an overview of those personal and political incentives (which are shaped by the interaction of formal and informal institutions), as well as the methods used to influence bureaucratic appointments in Pakistani Punjab. I show that different combinations of 'incentive structures' and 'appointment methods' produce different patronage bonds, and the nature of these bonds determines whether or not desired outcomes (electoral gain, bureaucratic efficiency, targeted service delivery) are achieved. Based on interviews and ethnographic observations, I find that those in a position to influence bureaucratic appointments are better able to bend outcomes to their personal or political advantage, not when they undertake 'illegal' appointments (which introduce higher personal and political costs), but when they exploit specific loopholes in the existing appointment procedures.