Paper short abstract:

This paper presents two case-studies of Dutch colonial governors who were fired for their stance on the role of free agents in colonial trade. This sheds light on the different realities of colonial monopoly enforcement and free agents influence in the Dutch overseas empires in the East and West.

Paper long abstract:

To secure their granted monopolies, the two Dutch chartered trading companies set up elaborate systems of corporate governance in their overseas territories. The commanders, governors and governors-general of both companies were responsible for trade, military affairs as well as protecting privileges of the companies against Dutch interlopers. In practice, however, free agents seem to have been able to wield considerable influence over the companies' colonial officials. This shows one way in which free agents responded to the creation of colonial monopolies.

To answer the question to what extend the careers of colonial governors-general was influenced by their stance regarding free agents, two case-studies will be presented. Both of the Dutch trading companies are represented in the two chosen cases, allowing for comparisons between the two. Issues such as the differences of opinion between governors and their colonial colleagues, as well as with the Dutch company boards will be addressed in the paper.

In both cases, governors-general were dismissed by their companies, but they seem to have taken very different approaches regarding free agents and company privilege. In the West the governor-general took a permissive approach, allowed free trade and was ultimately being fired for it. In the East the Governor-General took a more hard-line approach regarding free trade. This gave rise to serious conflicts within the East India company's colonial hierarchy and the governor-general was ultimately fired. These two cases suggest important differences between the two Dutch chartered companies in the protection of their monopolies.