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Abstract

The paper examines the evolution of relations between the European Union and the states of Central Asia after 2022, identifying Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a critical juncture that reshaped the post-Soviet order. The year 2022 constitutes not only a geopolitical watershed but also a turning point in the region’s perception of security, as Central Asian states refrained from recognizing the annexation of Ukrainian territories and intensified policies of economic diversification and multi-vector foreign engagement.

In this context, the European Union has shifted from a peripheral actor to a strategic partner, as reflected in the 2023 “Roadmap,” a joint document outlining the framework for enhanced cooperation. This framework encompasses the deepening of trade and investment ties, the institutionalization of regular economic dialogues, efforts to prevent sanctions circumvention, and expanded cooperation in the fields of energy and climate policy, including energy diversification and support for the transition toward renewable energy sources.

A crucial dimension of this new phase of partnership is the EU’s role as an “architect of corridors.” Particular importance is attributed to the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (Middle Corridor), which offers an alternative to the northern route passing through Russia. Investments under the Global Gateway initiative—targeting the modernization of ports, railways, and border infrastructure—aim to increase transit capacity and reduce transportation time between Asia and Europe.

Critical raw materials and nuclear fuel have also become central pillars of cooperation. Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, is increasingly perceived as a strategic reservoir of rare earth elements, manganese, chromium, copper, cobalt, and uranium—resources indispensable for the EU’s green and digital transitions. Strategic memoranda provide for cooperation across the entire value chain, from geological exploration and extraction to local processing and the integration of supply chains into European industry.

The paper argues that after 2022, EU–Central Asia relations have undergone a structural transformation: from a partnership of limited political relevance to one with pronounced geopolitical, infrastructural, and resource-based significance, embedded within the broader processes of fragmentation and reconfiguration of the contemporary international order.

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Abstract

Drawing inspiration from scholarship on resource affects and resource frontier making, this paper examines the ideological fantasies that surround the European Union's engagements with Central Asia’s critical raw materials. Based on an analysis of EU documents, speeches, and related policy materials, we analyze the dynamics of resource frontier (re-)making in the context of EU-Central Asia relations and critical raw materials.

We show how a set of fantasies emerges to suture what we call the critical raw materials paradox: the tension between advancing a green transition and the fact that its realization demands ever‑greater amounts of critical raw materials leading to a deepening of extractive relations and reproduction of what we refer to as the extractive symbolic order. We focus on three intertwined fantasies: "diversification", "Central Asia as a solution space", and the "chosen partnership". We show that these fantasies are riddled with paradoxes and inconsistencies, yet the EU’s affective investment sustains them, eclipsing counter‑logics and foreclosing alternative futures.

We also detail how contradictions seep in and destabilize fantasies and how such disruptions are quickly folded back into the extractivist symbolic order. This is a symbolic order consisting of a set of justificatory narratives that – while proposed as a solution to the climate crisis – continue to organize life around the extraction of natural resources: nature is imagined as a resource, the "periphery" as a supplier, and the "center" as a value adder.

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the strategic role of Central Asia in the European Union’s energy diversification strategy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As the EU seeks to reduce dependence on Russian energy, Central Eurasia gained attention as a potential source and transit space for oil, gas, and renewable energy creating both opportunities and constraints for regional and global actors.

The study addresses two central questions: to what extent can Central Asia realistically contribute to Europe’s energy diversification, and how do geopolitical and structural factors shape this potential? The paper argues that while Central Asia is increasingly positioned as a strategic energy partner, its capacity to replace big suppliers is limited. The region functions as a “pivot space” where competing interests of the EU, the United States, Russia, and China intersect, producing complex interdependencies.

A key insight is that EU diversification has not eliminated dependency but reconfigured it. Reliance on Liquefied Natural Gas imports from the United States introduces market-based asymmetries, price volatility, and logistical challenges, highlighting the limits of European energy sovereignty.

Methodologically, the paper combines analysis of EU and regional policy documents with case studies of major projects such as the Trans-Caspian corridor, Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon exports, and Uzbekistan’s gas initiatives. The analysis identifies three core limitations: infrastructure jam, great power competition, and fragmented regional governance. It also highlights how Central Asian states leverage these dynamics to pursue multi-vector policies and strengthen strategic autonomy.

By connecting energy flows, geopolitical competition, and regional agency, this paper provides a structured framework for understanding Central Asia’s evolving role in Europe’s energy strategy and contributes to broader debates on dependency, regional power, and strategic rebalancing in Eurasia.