Send message to Author

Abstract

In November 1933, a short-lived government was established in Kashgar in southwestern Xinjiang. Although it initially mobilized segments of local society, the regime collapsed within months under military pressure from the forces of Ma Zhongying. This paper reexamines the circumstances of its rapid demise by situating Kashgar within the wider geopolitical landscape of Central Eurasia in the 1930s.

Drawing on newly examined German diplomatic archives, the study argues that the Kashgar leadership’s prospects depended significantly on access to external military resources. In a frontier environment characterized by shifting alliances and limited institutional capacity, local political actors sought to consolidate authority not only through regional mobilization but also through cross-border procurement networks. Efforts to secure foreign arms were facilitated by an international intermediary whose connections extended to both European actors and Soviet authorities. Information regarding these negotiations reached Moscow and was subsequently communicated to the Nationalist government in Nanjing, prompting diplomatic protests and discouraging further external involvement.

German correspondence further indicates that foreign representatives in the region were aware of the intermediary’s complex affiliations but refrained from direct intervention, prioritizing broader strategic considerations. The interruption of anticipated arms supplies left the Kashgar authorities without the material resources necessary to withstand sustained military pressure. Deprived of external support, the regime was quickly defeated.

By tracing the circulation of information, diplomatic calculation, and material constraints across Eurasian networks, this paper highlights how political initiatives in Xinjiang were shaped by forces extending beyond the province itself. Kashgar functioned as a nodal space within overlapping spheres of influence, where local projects of governance were conditioned by regional power dynamics. The case illustrates how borderland politics in the 1930s unfolded within a transregional arena structured by competing strategic priorities, rather than solely by internal ideological agendas.

Send message to Author

Abstract

The paper examines a history of the dynasty of Hakim-begs who were rulers of the Ili region of East Turkestan (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China) for several centuries. The clan of the Ili Hakim-begs originated from the Hwaja clan, which established a theocratic rule in Kashgaria (East Turkestan) in second half of the XVII century. While early stages of the dynasty’s history is quite vague, clear lineage system of the Hwajas can be traced since the first years of the Qing conquest of Kashgaria (since 1759). This lineage was represented by the rulers of eastern oases of Turfan, Toqsun and Lukchun of Xinjiang. Their ancestor was Imin wang, who was bestowed the title of ‘wang’ by the Qing Emperor immediately after the conquest of Zhungaria and Kashgaria. For about 200 years, representatives of this clan gained positions of rulers in the Ili region, with the center in the city of Ghulja. After re-conquest of Xinjiang by the Qing forces, Xinjiang was turned into a province of the Qing empire (1884), and the beg’s position was liquidated, but the Ili Hakim-begs remained an authoritative and respectful clan. When the second East Turkistan Republic (ETR) was set up in three districts of Ili, Altay and Tarbaghatai in 1944, the revolutionary leaders invited the Ili Hakim-bek Giyassidin to the government of ETR. He was given a position of deputy Chair of the ETR government. After the Communist takeover (1949), some descendants of Hakim beg stayed in Xinjiang, while others migrated to Central Asia and today reside in Almaty and Bishkek, some of them migrated to Sweden. A high rank representative of the clan Hwaja Hakimov, b. 1936, passed away in Urumchi in 2023. The paper will discuss how Hakim-beg’s clan was used by the Qing/Chinese/ETR/PRC authorities in the governance and control of the Ili region.