Abstract

The China-Central and Eastern European Countries (C-CEEC) framework, launched amid the European debt crisis in the early 2010s, serves as a vehicle for economic, political, and socio-cultural cooperation between China and the CEE region. Formalized in 2012 as the "16+1" (later "17+1" with Greece’s participation), the initiative initially included 16 CEE nations: 11 from the European Union (EU)–Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania (subsequently withdrew), Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, and five non-EU states–Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Multi-level cooperation is facilitated and coordinated by a Beijing-based Secretariat with representatives from C-CEEC member states.

The C-CEEC’s objectives center on fostering trade, investment, and infrastructure development. The framework facilitates CEE countries to attract Chinese investments in transport, energy, and technology, and to diversify export destinations. Integrating this framework into China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative also advances the country’s goals of increasing its exports and geopolitical influence in Europe. Chinese enterprises have invested over $16 billion in CEE countries (2012–2019), while CEE investments in China totaled about $1.5 billion. The China-CEE Investment Fund, launched in 2012 and later expanded, supports joint infrastructure projects, often utilizing Chinese equipment. A Chinese state-owned shipping company notably purchased a majority share of Greece’s port of Piraeus, Europe’s second-largest container port. For some states like Hungary and Serbia, Chinese funding fills investment gaps left by the EU and drives growth in ICT and manufacturing sectors.

Despite these promising developments, the framework faces significant economic and security challenges which deserves further study. I will investigate what are the concerns raised by CEE countries on their massive and increasing trade deficits with China, as well as slowing or disproportionate Chinese investments in various CEE states. I will analyze how the United States-China trade “war” starting in 2018 and subsequent technological conflict has divided CEE/European perspectives on cooperation with China, particularly on data security regarding the use of Chinese digital infrastructure, and Chinese adherence to EU rules concerning environmental and procurement standards. I will also scrutinize the extent to which the Russia-Ukraine war and Iran’s war with the U.S. and Israel affects CEE relations with China, in terms of alignments in foreign security and economic policies. As the CEE region is a core area of interest to China, as well as Russia, the U.S., and the rest of Europe, Beijing’s continuing involvement in the C-CEEC and the framework’s ability to overcome challenges merit our attention.