Abstract

This paper explores why constitutional reforms in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have failed to ensure the independence of the judiciary and to curb the activities of the prosecution service, despite three decades of reform of the judicial and prosecutorial systems. Drawing on an analysis of contemporary constitutional and institutional trends, this study examines the courts and the public prosecutor’s office as an interlinked sphere of authoritarian legal governance, a legacy of the Soviet period that continues to shape institutional standards.

The study proposes the concept of strategic constitutional layering as an explanatory framework. Constitutions adopted following independence enshrined the formal independence of the judiciary and limited the role of the public prosecutor’s office to legal oversight . However, subsequent reforms have added new layer of judicial councils, qualification commissions, constitutional courts and mechanisms for overseeing the activities of the prosecution service, which are supposed to strengthen autonomy whilst maintaining the dominance of the executive branch in matters of appointments, discipline, budgets and case allocation. Examples of this include the constitutional referendum in Kazakhstan after 2022 and the judicial reforms in Uzbekistan in 2023. The new powers of the Supreme Judicial Council coexist with the president’s right to veto appointments, whilst the hierarchy of the public prosecutor’s office retains priority in investigations. From an empirical perspective, the analysis highlights differences between the two countries. Kazakhstan exhibits greater institutional proliferation (multiple judicial bodies, a stronger rhetorical commitment to independence), yet prosecutorial dominance persists in politically sensitive cases, where prosecutorial discretion and judicial deference aligned with executive interests. Uzbekistan shows a more streamlined structure post-Mirziyoyev, with prosecutorial reform emphasising “human rights compliance”, but similar patterns emerge in cases such as that of Akmaljon Shukurov, where courts deferred to the prosecution’s framing despite procedural innovations. Both systems maintain structural advantages for the prosecution over the courts in pre-trial phases, with judges positioned as administrative implementers rather than adversarial checks.

The paper argues that, in the context of Central Asian studies, strategic constitutional multi-layering mimics judicial power without actually granting it, thereby maintaining the coordination of executive power through the courts and the prosecution service. This explains why discourse on the rule of law has not led to an institutional break in these post-Soviet states.