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The article focuses on the phenomenon of hybrid threats in Georgia, especially those coming from Kremlin-linked political parties. I concentrate on how are the hybrid threats presented through the narratives these parties use to communicate with potential voters and show them the "reality" in their way.

Based on my research, I find notable parallels between the narratives used by these Georgian political parties and those promoted by the Kremlin. To be precise, I point out the similarities in their views on the European Union, the 'West', LGBTQ topics, the COVID-19 pandemic, liberalism, and others. I suggest these parties share similar anti-systemic, undemocratic, or populist political tendencies, such as German AfD and Hungarian Fidesz. By using rhetoric similar to their Russian partners, these parties are contributing to the hybrid threats, although in a less visible way than the cyber-attacks and other specific hybrid forms.

Another issue related to these political parties is their attitude towards the media. The media is one of the easiest ways to manipulate the nation through narratives, so it is profitable to have control over it and decide which news the citizens should hear or read. However, this subtle proliferation poses a strong danger to Georgia's democracy and democratic institutions.

My study contributes to academic discourse on hybrid threats and political manipulation by clarifying the influence of Kremlin-linked narratives on Georgian political discourse. Based on expert interviews, content and discourse analysis, and analysis of the media corpus, my research offers insights into the mechanisms through which hybrid threats are being materialized in Georgia.

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Regarding cultural diplomacy, as a part of soft power's tools of attraction, the classical mode of action and observation has been focused on the promotion of national culture. Since the 1970s, France and Germany have progressively shifted their activities to a more modern approach of cultural diplomacy based on international cultural cooperation and bridging cultures. This move permitted not only tense collaboration between the two countries, for example, through an Elysee-fund to finance common projects abroad, but also the creation in 2019 of the Treaty of Aachen, establishing Franco-German Cultural Institutes in third countries. One of the nine new institutes is in progress in Bishkek and should open this coming year. It represents a promising new era in what I called transnational cultural diplomacy for European values in an increasingly competitive context of soft power, especially in Central Asia.

The aim of my communication paper is, first, to present the possible place for French and German soft power amidst American, Chinese, Russian, and Turkish influences in Central Asia, among others. It is not only about measuring the attractiveness of different countries, but also about understanding how different external influences interact, compete, or cooperate within the same space. Thus, my goal is to answer the question of what cultural niche exists for the European values of a Franco-German cultural institute in Central Asia. Second, I will observe the activities of the French and German cultural institutes in the region, focusing especially on binational cooperations and emphasizing the cultural activities of the Franco-German Cultural Institute project in Bishkek.

Based on interviews with the actors involved in Franco-German cultural diplomacy, I will here present the first results concerning the challenges of transnational cultural diplomacy. The first challenge is intercultural, or rather Franco-German, and calls into question the importance of multilingualism as well as the ability to navigate between different administrative systems. The second challenge is transcultural and concerns the projection of hypothetical Franco-German synergy at the local level. Indeed, the development of binational collaboration relies in part on the goodwill of local German and French players, particularly where there is a need to pool resources in difficult economic and political contexts, as well as in high-tension geopolitical areas.

Keywords: cultural diplomacy, transnational diplomacy, Franco-German, Bishkek, Central Asia, ICFA/DFKI

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The wars in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine are just a few cases whereby Russia and Turkey have been confronted; hence, they have also been able to work together. Although Russia and Turkey have diverse interests in their near abroad, they have realized the necessity of cooperation. They have continuously improved their relations not only for ‘technical areas’ such as energy, military, and trade but also for regional and global political issues, and they have cooperated through their joint resistance to the West by sharing their ambition of a greater “imperial” role in global politics.

In this vein, this study aims to investigate the mechanisms through which Russia and Turkey's leaders – Presidents Putin and Erdogan, consolidate their power (both externally and internally) and the rhetoric they employ(-ed) in (re-)constructing the country's position and its imperial identity in world politics. Both leaders engage(-d) with an imperial identity, distinguishing them as neither European nor Asian. Using the ‘imperial’ identity has been focused on promoting the more significant influence of the historical empire(s) on domestic and international politics. The imperial identity subsequently promotes the revival and reconstitution of the empire and the imperial past, whereby Russia and Turkey have been re-engaged with their historical empire(s) at the internal and external levels.

However, current literature either neglects or inadequately addresses the link between the national identity changes and the structural changes in the international system by Presidents Putin and Erdogan. The transformation and changing of Russia and Turkey's state identity should be examined at the internal (national identity) and external (international system) levels. Since the state identity is not a fixed concept, political leaders continually interpret and reinvent the identity in light of historical and political events. In this case, Russian and Turkish imperial identities successfully show that their imperial goals did not stay [only] in the past. They are still the prospectuses for the current and future of the country's role in world politics.

As a result, this research seeks an answer to the following question concerning the imperial state identity in Russia and Turkey under the Putin and Erdogan regimes: “How do political leaders in Russia and Turkey employ the concept of imperial consciousness to make state identity in the hierarchical international system?” Within this framework, the primary purpose of the research is to examine the discursive construction(s) of empire and imperial consciousness in the making of state identity.

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This paper has been published by the George Washington University's Central Asia Program and was presented during the annual World Korea Forum in Stockholm, Sweden in 2022.

It encompasses my recent decade of research on the overseas Korean diasporas in Central Asia (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) and Russia as well as in Mexico and Cuba. Their history in each of the recipient countries is different as are the circumstances of their original migrations in various periods of time, starting from the mid-19th century all the way to mid-20th century. However, the notion of ethnic and historical belonging as well as cultural similarities of the overseas Korean people in each country and region have genuinely interlinked them globally and so did the politics.

South Korea has been exercising its soft power in each corresponding region where the respective countries top its major economic and political partners list (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia as well as Russia in Eurasia and Mexico in Latin America) through the outreach to the ethnic Korean diasporas in each country and all regions in very similar ways.

By having learned its lessons of building strong connections with each respective country in Central Asia and Eurasia through the decades of successful economic and cultural support of the local Korean diasporas and political promotion of their leaders to the national governments in each country, South Korea has mastered its soft power and diplomacy in Eurasia and has been recently applying the same tactics in Latin America that have as a result culminated in the successful promotion of the bilateral free trade agreement with Mexico in 2022 and sealed its leading cooperation with this country in the whole Latin American region.

The history of the arrival and successful assimilation although through a lot of trouble of the Korean diasporas in each respective country - Russia in Eurasia and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia as well as Mexico and Cuba in Latin America - still has an extremely deep influence on the modern day politics and economic and cultural cooperation not only of these local Korean diasporas but the respective countries and regions as a whole with North East Asia in general and South Korea particularly.

Thus the Korean diasporas in each respective country have become global players in their diplomatic relations with South Korea and their role in global politics has been sealed through their original history in Eurasia.