Paper abstract:

In July 2022 I visited Terter region of Azerbaijan to examine the changes that happened in the perception of the local population towards the neighboring Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh after the military clash between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the fall of 2020. According to the officials, Terter was a region that severely suffered during the continuous Armenian artillery shelling. I was sure that people whose relatives were killed and injured, whose houses were destroyed or damaged due to this shelling wouldn’t be able to express any positive attitudes towards the Armenian nation. However, my expectations were not approved; and people who agreed to share their ideas concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations expressed only positive attitudes toward the Armenian nation. Nearly two months after this visit, on September 12-13th another escalation erupted along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. This time I was able to hear the university students' opinions concerning the same questions. The generation that has never met any single member of the Armenian community, in contrast to the old generation has completely negative attitudes toward the neighboring nation. My goal is not a comparative analysis of the perceptions of the older and younger generations of modern Azerbaijani society towards Armenia and Armenians. Furthermore, my goal is to understand the role of the different sources, written and spoken, in the construction of the personal narratives of pain that help to support anti-Armenian sentiments alive. To study what is the relationship between written/official and oral/individual narratives of nationalism liked we first analyzed two written sources of nationalistic attitudes and blind patriotism - national historiography and media outlets. Then, a survey was conducted to explore the content of the individual narratives of pain. Mixed methods, a combination of descriptive qualitative and quantitative methods, were used for this research.

Paper abstract:

The article analyzes the socio-political and economic situation in the Bukhara Emirate (in local historical literature, the period of the Mangit dynasty of 1756–1920 is defined as the "Emirate of Bukhara") in the second half of the 19th century - the beginning of the 20th century, especially the Sunni-Shia rebellion in January 1910, based on archival documents.

The Emirate of Bukhara is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state, where along with Muslims Jews, Hindus, and Christians had lived for ages. From 1868, the representatives of the Russian Empire establish political relations with the Shiites in the administration. Because Shia slaves increased in the ranks of the palace and the social equality associated with the abolition of slavery as the country became a protectorate. The occurrence of such changes in society will cause the Sunni nobles to become opposed to the Shiites, resulting in a conflict between them. Local residents and madrassa students also joined the conflict because the local population began to be dissatisfied with taxes and socio-educational changes.

Newly discovered archival documents depicts that the khanates of Central Asia were also influenced by the ideas of social equality by the members of the Babi movement in Iran since the members of the Babi movement, which was defeated in Iran took refuge in Central Asia. They fled across in Turkestan Governorate, Bukhara and the Khiva Khanates. They also influenced muslim aristocracy in Central Asia, especially Bukhara ideologically.

The pretext of the uprising in Bukhara, which took place on January 9-13, 1910, was ‘to dethrone Amir Seid Abdulahad Khan (1885-1910) (because of his qushbegi, mother, and wife were from the Shias) and put one of his Sunni brothers’. The conflict initiated on the day of the Shiite mourning ceremony of Shokhsey-vokhsey, which is held in the month of Ashura.

The uprising was not a religious conflict, but was actually the result of the socio-political and economic crisis in Bukhara at the beginning of the 20th century. In its occurrence, the influence of external forces was very large, and this was the next plan of the Great Game. The suppression, consequences, and results of the rebellion are analyzed on the basis of local and foreign historical sources, periodical press materials, archival documents, and contemporary researchs.

Paper abstract:

This paper studies a unique Manchu-Mongolic-Turkic trilingual edict from Qing to Qoqand in 1788, this study combines the methods of linguistics, philology, and history. The main content of this edict was enticing the ruler of Qoqand to capture Samsaq, the escaped orphan of Burhan id-din Khoja, and send him to Qing. I offer the transcription and translation of all three language versions and the translation of its Chinese version for the first time. Through analyzing the text for its linguistic features and translation features, I point out its original text was Manchu, and all other versions were translated from Manchu. I argue this document shows the absence of Chinese in the Qing court’s multilingualism in contact with the area outside the Sinosphere, and the role of Oirat Mongolic in Central Asia even 30 years after the falling of Jungars, and the Qomul Turkic has left a deep mark on the Qing court’s vernacular Turkic practicing in Peking. Then I introduce the historical background of this document and explain why and how this edict was not delivered. I also argue that the fate and whereabouts of Samsaq have all along been tracking Qing’s attention because he was holding the legitimacy of ruling the Qing newly conquered land, and the Central Asian rulers were not cooperating with Qing on this issue. I argue this document is not only important for history but also for historical Turkic linguistics, and I also emphasize that this edict is the only cultural relic that remained nowadays among all the others. This paper is based on first-hand materials, including archives and other historical materials.

Paper abstract:

This study focuses on the placement of prisoners of war captured by the Russian

Empire and brought to Turkestan. From September 1914, POWs were placed in military camps

in Turkestan, and by June 1915, the number of such camps reached 37. The following can be

shown as the reasons for the placement of many prisoners of war in Turkestan: Firstly, the

military camps in Turkestan are located far away from the Center, and as a result there was no

possibility of escape, secondly, it was important that the food products in this country were

sufficient and cheap compared to other regions of Russia. The captured military officers, doctors,

engineers and officials were mostly Austro-Hungarians and German who were placed in the

districts of Turkestan, such as Tashkent, Skobelev (Fergana), Namangan, Kokand, Samarkand,

New Bukhara (Kogon), Jizzakh, Khojand. As of July 21, 1915, there were about 150,000

prisoners of war in Turkestan. By March 1916, the number of prisoners of war in the country

reached 200,000. Sometimes, their number surpassed the population of the cities where they

settled.