Send message to Author

Paper abstract

COVID-19 has acted as a precursor to the ambitious agenda of the US and China in Central Asia. Economic impacts on Central Asian economies have added complexity to the growing urge for greater initiatives to overcome the socioeconomic challenges posed by COVID-19. China’s tender hug in the form of COVID diplomacy, followed by the losing position of the US, has raised the ante for increased Chinese influence in the region. The urge for an increase in investments, followed by the change of administration in Washington, has raised questions for Central Asian states over the geopolitical interplay between the great powers and regional actors. The paper explores how China, Russia, the US, and the EU tried to act as a "savior" for Central Asian economies by projecting their support for the region, but China comes out as the only successor because of its economic-strategic interests in the region and its role as a major long-term economic partner for regional economies. At the same time, China has been able to gain supremacy on the regional chessboard through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The paper concludes that the BRI acts as an incarnation of Chinese influence in the region, whereas the SCO projects China's soft power and adds strategic resilience to its regional goals. China’s geo-economic interests in the region are catalyzed by COVID, thus fostering the long-term economic cooperation offered by Beijing to Central Asian economies.

Send message to Author

Paper abstract

As China-led infrastructure connectivity entangles Beijing’s neighboring states with roads, ports, and railroads, the outbreak of COVID-19 exposed the sinister side of China’s grand flagship project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The more interconnected the world is, the higher the risks of contagion are. While the implications of the coronavirus are yet to be assessed, it is already apparent that the relations of China with its partners will require a major overhaul.

Multiple accounts of virus-related anti-Chinese manifestations around the world exposed increasingly complex relations of China with other states. While Beijing views itself as a benevolent actor with full responsibility for shaping the international environment and building ‘a community of common destiny’, in many instances there is resistance to Chinese outreach on both local and national levels. Recipient communities such as those in Central Asia worry about impacts of Chinese investments on existing governance problems, environmental risks, and debt traps. Even the prospects of sustainable and inclusive growth cannot mitigate some deeply rooted fears and sentiments.

In this regard, it becomes less surprising that Chinese initiatives in the region are clouded by rumors, speculative knowledge, and conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories are the discourses, which explain a significant event as secretly planned and executed by an agent or a group of agents. Moon landings, Illuminati, Bilderberg Group, and the New World Order are a small fraction of conspiracy theories that dominate public discourses around the globe. However, conspiracy theories shall not be regarded purely from an entertainment perspective, as these narratives often embody distorted realities of existing problems.

Conspiracy theories are not about truth or falsehood, but about their power to affect both political discourses and political practices. Accordingly, this work will examine the sources of anti-Chinese conspiracy theories in Central Asia and whether they are reproducing elitism, patriarchy, and patronage as modes of governance in the region. The article will also explore whether the outbreak of coronavirus had a toll on Chinese initiatives in Central Asia and the narratives of the Chinese dream of the common and harmonious future.

Send message to Author

Paper abstract

Modernisation of Kazakhstan’s digital infrastructure has brought the population under growing systematic control, and Kazakh media have voiced concern that government authorities are about to introduce a Chinese-style social credit system. Central Asian states, due to their Soviet past, have intelligence practices that is implemented with an aim to serve the state and safeguard its political power, such as Russia’s Operative Investigative Measures (SORM). This allows state agencies direct legal access to any national communication system. However, three commercial actors are involved for SORM to work: the manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, the communications service provider, and the surveillance companies. Most global tech companies have resisted attempts to impose particularly intrusive surveillance practices. Chinese technology, however, appears instrumental in enabling invasive mass surveillance. Considering that Chinese e-commerce, telecommunications, technology - and security companies are taking root, this paper hopes to understand China’s role in Kazakhstan’s authoritarian digitalisation by identifying how Chinese technologies interweave with local sociotechnical imaginaries (STI).

The trajectory of STIs depends on particularities of the past, the struggles of the present, and fantasies about the future. Understanding the historical underpinnings of various power structures is therefore crucial to understand the significance of present actors. Kazakh authoritarian elite interest is supported by Nazarbayev’s nation building and informs the country’s digitalisation process. This paper trace Kazakh STIs through the post-soviet blueprint of local surveillance infrastructures and communication networks, the historical foundations for perspectives on human rights, religion, and clan-oriented power structures, and analyse how these STIs interact with China’s regional security narrative.

Send message to Authors

Paper abstract

Large-scale migration and globalization have transformed the dynamics of human geography, leading to increased contact between previously distant groups. This project investigates how the presence of a new outgroup transforms the identities and alters the behaviors of host communities. Specifically, we examine the effect that the influx of Chinese migrant workers under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has had on identity and local social and political dynamics in Kyrgyzstan. We leverage geolocated BRI project sites and multiple waves of the Life in Kyrgyzstan survey to investigate how proximity to BRI infrastructure projects has impacted the salience of national and ethnic identity in Kyrgyzstan as well as the levels of outgroup trust and engagement. We pair this analysis with data on individual social and political behavior to assess how shifts in identity impact participation in elections, social organizations, and protest. By examining group identity and social cohesion in Kyrgyzstan, this project will shed light on the promises and pitfalls stemming from contact between migrant groups and host societies and provide valuable insight into the social and political ramifications of the BRI.