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Note: I am re-submitting my paper because I could not attend the 2022 conference in Bloomington, Indiana. I was also awarded a travel grant but I was not able to use it last year.

Abstract

Although the Taliban return to power has effectively invalidated the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, it is important to reflect upon the implementation and performance of the Constitution and the extent to which it shaped political actions and legal order during its lifetime (2004-2021). One of the critical areas the 2004 Constitution regulated was the law-making process in Afghanistan. Article 94 of the Constitution defines “law” as “what both houses of the National Assembly approve and the President endorses” unless it is proclaimed otherwise by the Constitution. Elsewhere, the Constitution expressly allows the executive branch to issue legislative decrees if urgently needed while the House of Representatives is in recess. According to the Constitution, legislative decrees would become law after the President’s endorsement. However, the Constitution also required the executive branch to present legislative decrees to the National Assembly within thirty days of holding its first session. The Constitution further indicated that legislative decrees would be invalidated if refuted by the National Assembly. These provisions of the Constitution had become a battleground between the executive branch and the National Assembly for interpreting and establishing each branch’s legislative power. The executive branch was accused of misusing its narrow legislative power to issue an excessive number of legislative decrees, thus overstepping its authority, and undermining the National Assembly’s legislative powers. In all President Ghani’s administration enacted approximately 233 works of legislation.

This paper will examine those legislative acts within the parameters of the above constitutional provisions, assessing the constitutionality and unconstitutionality of the statutes via the lens of the standards, limits, and procedures set out in the 2004 Constitution. The paper will also explore and analyze the possible reasons for and circumstances when the executive branch would use legislative decrees in one area but allow the normal legislative process to run its course in another. The findings of the research will contribute to the study of constitutional law, expand the understanding of the fall of a (nominally) constitutional democracy, and explicate the politics of law-making in Afghanistan over the last two decades.

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During the last thirty years there has been an explosion in the number of memorial museums. Especially the old colonies started to use such museums in nation-building. Kazakhstan was the most disadvantaged country in nation-building and history writing because only one-third of the population was Kazakhs in independence due to policies of the Russian and Soviet Empires. Kazakhstan did not hesitate to use memorial museums in nation-building. This work is about the role of the Museums of Victims of Political Oppression in nation building of Kazakhstan in the case of the Aljir Memorial and Museum Complex which was built on the site of Akmolinskiy Concentration Camp for the Wives of the Homeland Traitors. Since independence Kazakhstan has implemented both Kazakhstani and Kazakh nationalism, Aljir complex appealed to Kazakhstani nationalism because oppression was implemented to all ethnic groups. Stalin was shown as only culprit; the Russians, the Soviet Union, and even communism were not presented as part of the persecution.

Key Words: Memorial Museums, National Building, Kazakhstan, Aljir, Gulag.

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Why do some authoritarian regimes reject while others engage in democracy promotion (DP) by international actors? My dissertation explains the observed variation in authoritarian reactions to external DP. I argue that the domestic legitimacy concerns of the authoritarian regime determine its reaction to international actors' democracy promotion policies (DPP). Specifically, the more concerned the authoritarian regime is about its legitimacy, the more likely it will reject the DPP directly or indirectly threatening the regime’s existence while still engaging in the areas of DP that would boost its legitimacy and stability. On the contrary, if the regime is confident of its legitimacy, it will permit a broad range of international democracy promoters to operate in the country while limiting their activities only in some areas to a certain degree. Using Azerbaijan as a case study, with a longitudinal analysis encompassing 1993-2022 I show factors that contributed to the divergent responses of two authoritarian regimes in Azerbaijan to the DP by international actors. In doing so, I examine the behavior of the government of Haydar Aliyev (1993-2003) and that of his son Ilham Aliyev (2003-2022) in dealing with Western democracy promoters with a particular focus on the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.). The dissertation contributes to the literature on the DP by international actors in authoritarian regimes and on authoritarian legitimacy and stability showing that the domestic legitimacy concern of the authoritarian regime is the key driver of how it will respond to the external DP.

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This paper aims to critically narrate a novel brand of legal populism purveyed in the politics of President Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan. The problems in Kyrgyzstan with rule of law and justice are serious and have been building up over the years and multiple presidencies. However, President Japarov, by far the most impressive populist than all his predecessors, has taken the problem to a new level, as he and his administration have treated numerous matters pertaining to law – especially many judicial matters – in a distinctively populist and self-serving manner. The Japarov legal populism has tapped into emotive, popular and customarily “felt” notions of the right and just, as it effectively suppressed formal legal procedure and norms of justice. From phenomena such as “kusturizatsia” and amnesty laws, to demonstrations of will and resolve for justice and forgiveness where strictly legal judicial decisions applied, to much else, President Japarov’s treatment of law risks doing deep damage to the already seriously ailing legal and justice affairs of Kyrgyzstan. It also stands as an interesting case for analysis from a political ethnographic perspective, promising to broaden our understanding of how and when political populism translates into populism – and, certainly, corruption – of law.

In this undertaking, the paper builds on some earlier works on law and its peculiar workings in Kyrgyzstan, especially that of Judith Beyer, as it tries to introduce some nuances of the latest periods, and hence, an excursus. It will be based on analysis of relevant events, decisions and language based on publicly available information as well as a limited number of interviews with people with close knowledge of the subject.