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Paper abstract

Using Framing Theory and Social Network Analysis, this report investigates how migration is framed in the Georgian media and who establishes these frames. The analysis is based on twelve media outlets, monitored during the period 1 August 2019 – 1 August 2021. The sample included television, online and print media. The most common frames observed were based on morality, human interest and responsibility, followed by conflict, economic and threat frames. Overall, media coverage of migration tends to be event oriented and relatively balanced. Reporting on migration is dominated by emigration issues, while immigration issues are largely absent.

As Georgian media outlets reflect different socio-political positions, coverage of migration is heavily driven by editorial policy. Mirroring this dynamic, one segment of the media intensively covers migration through the “human interest” frame. This kind of media coverage is characterised by more analytical reporting and provides the public with as much information as possible. However, it should be noted that even when media framing is mainly concerned with human interest stories, it nonetheless refers to migrants as passive victims, reaffirming the role of elites as powerful, active and in control of society.

The second form of coverage covers migration less intensively, through “moral” and “responsibility” frames, focusing on humanitarian aspects of emigration and attributing responsibility for solutions to government and authorities.

The third type of case refers specifically to a small subset of coverage, especially the print media that most often focuses on the “threat” and “conflict” frames, portraying immigrants as a threat to Georgian culture – giving rise to prejudiced attitudes toward immigrants. This kind of coverage is characterised by intolerance and a rejection of immigrants.

It is important to note that for much of the monitoring period Georgian media was responding to humanitarian crises such as the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, which to some extent has been reflected in the increased number of “moral” and “responsibility” frames voiced by the elites.

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Paper abstract

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan adopted a homeland rhetoric that sought to position the nation as the home of all Kazakhs worldwide. A crucial aspect of these nationalizing efforts was the implementation of a program of "return" for the millions of ethnic Kazakhs living outside of the borders of their so-called ethnohistorical homeland.

However, it has now been thirty years since the implementation of this program, and many of the children of these initial migrants have reached adulthood. Young Kazakhs are also now frequently choosing to move to Kazakhstan alone - often in pursuit of education and economic opportunity. Where do these youth consider their homeland to be, after having spent their formative years in two different places?

In this paper, I argue that these young migrants often do not consider Kazakhstan to solely be their homeland. Rather, I posit that they maintain a constellation of attachments between their country of origin and/or Kazakhstan which come together to construct unique conceptualizations of homeland that may not be bound by the borders of a nation-state. In other words, I explore how these migrants' aspirations, experiences, and relationships in both Kazakhstan and their country of origin shape what it means to be "home" - a place that is often, for them, found somewhere both between and within these two locales.

This argument is supported by insights taken from life history interviews that I have conducted with young Kazakh migrants as part of my ongoing research on this topic.