Paper long abstract:

China announced the high-profile Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, emphasizing the importance of connectivity across the Eurasian landmass. Surprisingly, the non-connectivity cooperation between China and Kazakhstan has, since then, increased far more than that related to connectivity such as resource extraction, pipeline construction and transport infrastructure. To this extent, this paper probes on how the Kazakh state and elites leverage the highly contingent and loosely defined Chinese dream and capital by diversifying investments towards non-resource and non-connectivity related sectors. Based on desktop and fieldwork investigation of China’s joint projects in Kazakhstan in the past 30 years, this paper illuminates that despite the asymmetric power relation, Kazakhstan has sought for Chinese support towards renewable energy, manufacturing and food processing. The structure of Kazakhstan’s export to China has shifted to include more intermediate and consumer goods. Interestingly, China’s determination to connect to the West has given the Kazakh government more leverage in demanding the non-connectivity projects. China’s presence has also fostered a mixed Sinophobic resistance and Sinophilic drive to shape the nuanced evolvement of the newly incorporated Sino-Kazakh joint projects.