Paper long abstract:

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan pledged major changes in the relationship between the Government of Uzbekistan and its citizens following his election to replace Islam Karimov in December 2016. The 2017-2021 Development Strategy outlines many areas of reform, though the first of five priorities is listed as "improving the system of state and public construction" and outlines the state plan to, among other ambitious political reforms, strengthen the role of parliament and political parties, develop the country's political life, reform public administration through decentralization, increase the role of media and improve communication with ordinary citizens. There is also an emphasis on enhancing the socio-political activity of women. With 2019 looming as an important year for Uzbekistan politically, the president made only passing mention of the parliamentary elections during extended new year's remarks, and offered no updates on the state of Uzbekistan's democratic reforms. Uzbekistan is nearly halfway through Mirziyoyev's groundbreaking "Strategy," and though there have been notable achievements in reforming regional government, making local leaders accountable, using social media to improve direct communication with citizens and attacking corruption, progress on the national political front appears to have stalled. At present there are still only four major political parties registered (all pro-government) and which have representation in the Oliy Majlis, with a fifth, the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, re-registering as a political party and preparing to compete for seats in December after its 15-seat quota was stripped by Mirziyoyev. No new political parties have been registered, or previous parties re-registered, suggesting that political competition will be confined to a few, long-standing parties that supported Karimov and have now pivoted to support his successor, Mirziyoyev. While it is true that building political parties takes time, solid ideas and finances, there are few signs that the political opposition, including the exiled Sunshine Coalition or former parties Erk and Birlik will be allowed to (re-) constitute and compete in the December elections. At the same time, the government is spending millions of so'ms to provide biometric voter identification cards for all voters and update the national voter registry, a formidable project that would normally take years but which the government is attempting to conduct in less than two. This paper will examine the incongruencies in the Uzbek political landscape and what can be anticipated for the parliamentary elections and beyond as the uncertain political reforms under the Strategy hit the halfway mark.