Paper long abstract:
Throughout much of the developing world, local government officials often use tools of social
extraction to compel citizens to provide public goods, services, and other collective goods (Lust
and Rakner 2018). In some cases, such efforts are voluntary and deeply embedded in local social
norms that encourage such cooperation. In other cases, such extraction is coerced. How do
efforts to engage in social extraction affect individual attitudes towards local government
authorities and the state in general? How do such efforts affect the quality of public goods
provided? This paper explores these questions in the context of rapidly reforming Uzbekistan
where quasi-customary local government officials routinely call upon citizens for collective
labor for the provision of some public goods. The process of social extraction is based on local
social norms that encourage voluntary provision (referred to locally as hashar). This paper will
seek to answer these questions by examining a unique, nested public opinion survey in
post-Karimov Uzbekistan. The survey includes a sample of quasi-customary officials (mahalla
leaders) along with a representative sample of individuals in their communities.